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INTRODUCTION
In forty years of conversations with educators working at institu-
tions that participate in NCAA Division I-A1 athletics, I have heard one
metaphor over and over again: big-time sports are the tail that wags the
academic dog.2 But the controversy came well before I became aware of
it, and before the advent of the National Collegiate Athletic Association,
and it had everything to do with football.
By the turn of the twentieth century, the Harvard faculty had voted
on numerous occasions to abolish football,3 to no effect. When the ven-
erable Charles W Eliot, by then President of Harvard for three and a
half decades, was asked in 1905 to "call a conference [of colleges] to
1. The National Collegiate Athletic Association classifies member institutions by the
number of teams fielded, the number of contests per season, and the number of par-
ticipants in sports. Division I institutions, for example, must sponsor at least seven
sports for men and seven sports for women (or six sports for men and eight sports for
women). Among institutions that sponsor football, Division I-A universities are now
called "Football Bowl Subdivision" schools and must meet both minimum fan atten-
dance and minimum player financial aid standards. http://www.ncaa.org/wps/ncaa?
ContentlD=418 (last visited Nov. 20, 2008).
2. The conversation started early for me as my father was the President of Wake Forest
University from 1967-83, a member of the athletically high-powered Atlantic Coast
Conference.
3. Ronald A. Smith, Harvard and Columbia and a Reconsideration of the 1905-06 Foot-
ball Crisis, 8 J. SPORT HISTORY 5, 5, 10 (1981).
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either reform or ban football," he promptly declined, stating that ad-
ministrators "certainly cannot reform football, and I doubt if by
themselves they can abolish it."4 Stanford and the University of Califor-
nia did abolish football from 1906-19 and 1906-15, respectively,
replacing it with rugby, until war and market pressures forced them to
return to football.5 When University of Michigan President James Bur-
rill Angell, in an effort to restore the integrity of college football,
persuaded other colleges to form a new league with Michigan, in 1906
legendary Michigan football coach Fielding Yost went over the Presi-
dent's head to the Board of Trustees and got them to restore the status
6
quo.
Thus have academics historically thrown up their hands, and that
has been the eventual response to date of most faculties and administra-
tions faced with the excesses of intercollegiate athletic programs-at
least those in NCAA Division I-A-in the ensuing century. Educators'
objections to intercollegiate athletics (particularly football) have been
many. The concerns expressed a century ago-brutality, professionaliza-
tion, commercialization, moral corruption, dilution of education, and
usurpation of academic control of the university-persist today. In the
last century, they have been exponentially magnified
This Article will focus, however, on an issue that was probably not
on the minds of 19th century educators, nor primarily on the minds of
4. Id. at 13.
5. Roberta J. Park, From Football to Rugby--and Back, 1906-1919: The University of
California-Stanford University Response to the "Football Crisis of 1905", 11 J. SPORT
HISTORY 5, 27-28, 36 (1984).
6. JAMES J. DUDERSTADT, INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS AND THE AMERICAN UNIVER-
SITY: A UNIVERSITY PRESIDENT'S PERSPECTIVE 232-33 (2003). It seems integral to
the hegemony of football for such football coaches always to be described as "legen-
dary." See infra text accompanying note 212.
7. There is an immense recent literature on the conflict between sports and academic
goals. See e.g., WILLIAM G. BOWEN & SARAH A. LEVIN, RECLAIMING THE GAME:
COLLEGE SPORTS AND INSTITUTIONAL VALUES (2003); WALTER BYERS, UNSPORTS-
MANLIKE CONDUCT: EXPLOITING COLLEGE ATHLETES 297-319 (1995) (authored by
the Director of the National Collegiate Athletic Association from 1951-66); DUDER-
STADT, supra note 6, at 189-204; JAMES L. SHULMAN & WILLIAM G. BOWEN, THE
GAME OF LIFE: COLLEGE SPORTS AND EDUCATIONAL VALUES (2001); RICK TE-
LANDER, THE HUNDRED YARD LIE: THE CORRUPTION OF COLLEGE FOOTBALL AND
WHAT WE CAN Do TO STOP IT (1996); JOHN R. THELIN, GAMES COLLEGE PLAY:
SCANDAL AND REFORM IN INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS 24-27, 182-83, 200
(1994)). Perhaps most significant is the ongoing work of the Knight Foundation
Commission on Intercollegiate Athletics, founded in 1991 by a distinguished group
of academic administrators and other experts to consider ways of corralling the
threats to education posed by big-time intercollegiate athletics. See Knight Commis-
sion on Intercollegiate Athletics, www.knightcommission.org.
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the legions of present-day academic critics of intercollegiate sports.
Namely, this Article explores the ways in which big-time athletics-
particularly football-normalize and encourage harms to women, in-
cluding educational and sexual harms. My theses depend upon
acknowledging certain open secrets about college football: that it is a
celebration of male physical supremacy (measured by male standards);
that it is something that society lets males do and have as their sport, for
reasons both good and bad; that football worship by both men and
women 8 is weirdly and widely accepted in spite of the huge costs of
football; and that football has a darkly gendered underside that deserves
serious consideration.
I emphasize three notions right up front. First, I do not advocate
the abolition of intercollegiate football. Rather, I present an analysis that
will, I hope, assist lawyers and courts to participate constructively in the
widely-shared goal of bringing football into balance with universities'
larger educational mission.
Second, perhaps I am old-fashioned, but I believe in that larger
educational mission. The university is sacred space to me, and my un-
derstanding of its mission is informed by classical notions of what it
would mean to teach young people to thrive. "Thriving" is of course a
contested concept, but it means, at least, freedom from narrowness,
from mental calcification, from the urge to violence, and, in Virginia
Woolf's immortal phrase, freedom from unreal loyalties.9 My discussions
of Aristotle and Woolf later in this Article are integrally connected to my
understanding of the university's "duty."
Third, central to my project is an understanding of the concept of
the "open secret." The idea, much discussed in contemporary philoso-
phy and literary criticism, entails socially organized ignorance. And the
interests that are protected by maintaining that ignorance always include
avoiding accountability. Domestic violence, for example, is a paradig-
matic example of an open secret. The data-the hideous statistics, the
predictable patterns, and the devastating results-are open secrets, but
they have not supplanted the preferred narrative that every incident of
domestic violence is still an isolated incident, and they have not caused
governments to make preventing domestic violence a top priority.' °
8. See, e.g., Camille Paglia, Gridiron Feminism: Why Women Should Love Football WALL
ST. J., Sept. 1, 2000, available at www.opinionjournal.com/forms/printThis.html?id=
65000205 ("Football ... [is] the religion of my brand of Amazon feminism.").
9. See VIRGINIA WOOLF, THREE GUINEAs 79 (1966).
10. I believe I saw every debate among the 2008 Democratic presidential candidates, and
I don't believe domestic violence was even mentioned. If it was mentioned, eliminat-
ing it was not a part of anyone's platform. It seemed impolite to bring it up.
[Vol. 15:205
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Literary critic Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, in her groundbreaking work
on the closet in which gay and lesbian people have lived and do live,
suggested the following as the "core grammar" of the open secret:
Don't ask. You shouldn't know. It didn't happen; it doesn't
make any difference; it didn't mean anything; it doesn't have
interpretive consequences. Stop asking just here; stop asking
just now; we know in advance the kind of difference that
could be made by the invocation of this difference; it makes no
difference; it doesn't mean."
In discussing this Article pre-publication, I've encountered the
problems of the open secret again and again. "These really are isolated
incidents." "The social science data prove nothing." "Football is just
another example of how entrenched systems of power work-what else
is new?" "You sound too shrill." "Violence will always be with us." Well-
meaning people, including feminist activists, have warned me off the
project. "Your life will change." "You'll inevitably be perceived as attack-
ing a sacred cow, are you ready for that?"' 2 "You'll never be taken
seriously again." Recounting these comments are not complaints on my
part, just statements of awareness, and admonitions that we avoid the
familiar pitfalls of open secrets.
This Article is ultimately about what lawyers and courts can do. I
argue simply that sexual abuse of women by football players-
sometimes encouraged through the excesses of university football pro-
grams-is unacceptable, and that every available avenue of relief must
be refigured and deployed in order to stop it. I conclude that, at the very
least, a civil action under a state constitutional equality guarantee could
bring the issues into much sharper relief.
ii. EvE KoSOFSKY SEDGWICK, EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE CLOSET 53 (1990).
12. Though I have not spoken with Professor Buzuvis, I was chilled by the account of the
siege following her mild challenge to team practices at a Division I school. At an open
faculty meeting, Buzuvis questioned whether there was a gender equality problem in
the University of Iowa's decision to maintain a pink locker room for visiting oppo-
nents in the new football stadium. She was thereafter subject to intense personal
attack, including, for example, an anonymous e-mail stating, "I'd love to lay you
down and cock-stab you in the ovaries." Erin E. Buzuvis, Reading the Pink Locker
Room: On Football Culture and Title IX, 14 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 1, 6 n.27
(2007).
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I. THE CONTEXT
A. Incidents and Cases
You know how it is in college ... You come into my room, you
already know what's going on.
-Tony Cole, former University of Georgia
basketball player, charged with aggravated
assault with intent to rape"
Somebody may knock on the door, a cute girl knocks on the
door. What do you do?
"Legendary" Penn State football coach Joe Paterno,
commenting on the suspension of Florida State linebacker
A.J. Nicholson before the 2006 Orange Bowl
because of sexual assault allegations"
1. News Stories
* November 2007: An Oklahoma State linebacker was dis-
missed from the team six days after he pled guilty to
sexual assault of a twelve-year-old girl. The linebacker was
allowed to keep his athletic scholarship and remain in
school.5
" July 2007: After the university's own investigation, Villa-
nova rescinded the admission of three incoming freshman
13. Christopher Flores, When Athletes Are Accused: Colleges Try to Strike Balance Between
Condemning Criminal Behavior and Giving Second Chances, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC.,
Apr. 19, 2002, at A39.
14. Mike Lopresti, Paterno's Gaffe is No Firing Offense, http://www.usatoday.com/sports/
columnist/lopresti/2006-01-09-lopresti-paterno.x.htm (last visited January 9, 2006)
(advising National Organization of Women-"hypersensitive types who spend more
time scrutinizing speech and thought than an FBI wiretap"-not to go after a win-
ning football coach).
15. Jeff Latzkeap, Linebacker Chris Collins Dismissed from Oklahoma State Football
Team, http://www.comcast.net/sports/articles/cfb/2007/11/08/Oklahoma.St-Collins/
(last visited Nov. 14, 2007).
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football players who were under investigation by local po-
lice for the sexual assault of a female Villanova student. 6
* April 2007: A University of Minnesota cornerback was
charged with criminal sexual conduct in the alleged rape
of an eighteen-year-old woman near campus. Three other
football players were suspects in the case. All four were
suspended from the football team.17
* April 2006: The University of Southern California's
backup quarterback was temporarily suspended from the
team pending police investigation of his arrest for sexually
assaulting a nineteen-year-old USC student.'8
* December 2005: Florida State football coach Bobby
Bowden forbade a starting linebacker from playing in the
Orange Bowl after the linebacker allegedly assaulted a
woman in the hotel where the team was staying. There
was no immediate arrest in the case. The linebacker's
status had been at issue earlier in the season because of
two other incidents; he was not suspended for either. 9
* January 2004: The Kansas State quarterback was accused
of sexually assaulting a Kansas State alumna the day be-
fore the Fiesta Bowl at the team hotel. At the last minute,
Coach Bill Snyder-in whose hands the decision solely
rested-allowed the player to participate in the bowl
game. Kansas State lost the Fiesta Bowl to Ohio State.2°
The Maricopa County, Arizona prosecutor eventually de-
clined to press charges against the player.2'
16. Associated Press, 'Nova Expels Three Involved Alleged [sic] Assault, available at http://
www.sportingnews.com/yourturn/viewtopic.php?t=2 45719 (last visited July 26, 2007).
17. Associated Press, CB Dominic Jones Released From Jail on $25,000 Bail, available at
http://sports.espn.go.com/ncf/news/story?id=2940070 (last visited July 17, 2007).
18. Associated Press, USC Suspends Sanchez After Sexual Assault Arrest, ESPN, April 27,
2006, available at http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/print?id+2423430&type=story
(April 27, 2006).
19. Steve Ellis, Florida State's Nicholson Accused of Sexual Assault, TALLAHASSEE DEMOC-
RAT, Dec. 29, 2005, available at http:/www./usatoday.com/sports/college/football/
acc/2005-12-29-fsu-nicholsonx.htm. It was this incident that gave rise to "legen-
dary" Coach Joe Paterno's "gaffe," quoted as an epigraph to this section.
20. Jason Whitlock, Snyder's Power Must Be Checked, KANSAS CITY StAR, Jan. 3, 2004, at
DI.
21. Associated Press, Prosecutors Won't Press Charges Against Roberson, USA TODAY,
Jan. 8, 2004, available at http://www.usatoday.com/sports/college/football/bigl2/
2004-01-09-roberson-clearedx.htm (the prosecutor said that Roberson "could not
have known" that the 22-year old woman who accused him did not consent).
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0 2004: Four separate women filed suit against the Univer-
sity of Washington for alleged sexual assaults perpetrated
by football players.22
* January 2002: A defensive tackle at the University of Mis-
sissippi was arrested and charged with sexual battery. He
was suspended from the team indefinitely.23 After transfer-
ring and playing at Murray State University, the defensive
tackle pled to the lesser charge of simple assault.24
2. Legal Dimensions: The Colorado Football Gang Rape Case
Other than one of the remarkable quotes at the beginning of this
section, which came from a college basketball player, and a later discus-
sion of the Duke Lacrosse debacle, this Article focuses on examples from
college football. Undoubtedly, sexual assaults and alleged sexual assaults
are associated (though, in general, to lesser extents) with other college
sports. There is no strictly empirical reason for my focus on football,
25except that football is the college sport defacto reserved for men.
More importantly, I find the history of U.S. collegiate football, de-
scribed in Section II.D, infra, to be an extraordinary subtextual history
of American masculinity. My focus is driven by the militaristic, hyper-
masculine mystique of football.26
22. Steve Miletich et al., 2 Women Sue Former Player, UW Alleging Sex Assaults, SEATTLE
TIMES, Feb. 28, 2004, at ROP News.
23. Flores, supra note 13.
24. Emery Carrington, Charges Lowered for Former UM Player, DAILY MISSISSIPPIAN,
Apr. 16, 2003, available at http://www.thedmonline.com/2.2838/1.125942.
25. My research indicates that only three women have played Division I football. That
does not stop women from playing the game. There are two professional full-contact
football leagues for women in the United States, comprising 80 teams and about
3,000 players. However, the athletes have to pay to play, while otherwise holding
down their day jobs, and have to practice and play at always varying locations. As one
player said, "What we'd like is to make a living at this .... Boys and men have no
idea how lucky they are to have this just handed to them. It breaks my heart." Sophia
Hollander, Taking Aim at Gender Barriers in a Full-Contact Sport, N.Y. TIMES, May
13, 2008, at D2.
26. The late great comedian George Carlin famously compared the pastoral sport of
baseball with the militaristic sport of football. George Carlin, Baseball and Football,
www.baseball-almanac.com/humor7.shtml. Here are some of the great lines:
[Vol. 15:205
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Returning to the legal dimension, my primary example is Simpson
v. University of Colorado,27 a case involving a gang-rape that implicated
not only football players, but also football team recruits. Ms. Simpson
was a CU student. She and her roommates elected to have a "girls' night
in" at her apartment. One roommate, who was also a "tutor" for the CU
football team, arranged for a group of football players and recruits-
during an official recruiting visit to Boulder-to come over after the
guys had already been partying. About twenty did so. Simpson knew
none of the recruits or players who visited her apartment. Allegedly, after
Simpson went to sleep in her room, she was vaginally and orally raped by
five of the men. Simultaneously, three men harassed and assaulted a sec-
ond plaintiff, Ms. Gilmore. After Simpson and Gilmore went public with
"Baseball is played on a diamond, in a park. The baseball park!
Football is played on a gridiron, in a stadium, sometimes called Soldier
Field or War Memorial Stadium."
"In football you wear a helmet.
In baseball you wear a cap."
"Football is concerned with downs-what down is it?
Baseball is concerned with ups-who's up?"
"In football you receive a penalty.
In baseball you make an error."
"Baseball has the seventh inning stretch.
Football has the two minute warning."
"Baseball has no time limit: we don't know when it's gonna end-might
have extra innings.
Football is rigidly timed, and it will end even if we've got to go to sudden
death."
And finally, the objectives of the two games are completely different:
"In football the object is for the quarterback, also known as the field gen-
eral, to be on target with his aerial assault, riddling the defense by hitting
his receivers with deadly accuracy in spite of the blitz, even if he has to use
the shotgun. With short bullet passes and long bombs, he marches his
troops into enemy territory, balancing this aerial assault with a sustained
ground attack that punches holes in the forward wall of the enemy's defen-
sive line.
In baseball the object is to go home! And to be safe!-I hope I'll be safe at
home!"
27. Simpson v. Univ. of Colo., 372 F. Supp. 2d 1229 (D. Colo. 2005), rev'd, 500 F. 3d
1170 (10th Cir. 2007).
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their account, they faced hostility and threats on campus. Gilmore left
Colorado for a year; Simpson dropped out of college altogether.28
Allegedly, head football Coach Gary Barnett (and coaches before
him) had long refused to change recruiting practices that included un-
supervised hard partying with student hosts, citing "recruiting
disadvantage." He opposed a zero tolerance policy for sex and alcohol
on recruiting visits. In addition to the sorts of drunken parties described
by the plaintiffs, the football program indirectly paid for or tolerated
strip shows, lap dances, and prostitutes for recruits.
29
According to the plaintiffs, over a period of four years there had
been a number of rapes, sexual assaults, and incidents of sexual harass-
ment by football players that Coach Barnett and the football program
had known about and had either ignored or had tried to cover up. One
nineteen-year-old female trainer for the football team was raped by a
team member and reported the rape to the police. Coach Barnett called
her to his office, and, while he did not question the fact of the rape, told
her that if she pursued the charges he would "back his player 100%"
and that her "life would change."3 ° On another occasion, Coach Barnett
pressured the campus police to drop a sexual assault investigation of
football players.31
Paradigmatic of the Colorado football program, and Coach Bar-
nett's stewardship of it, is the story of Katie Hnida. Hnida was recruited
by Barnett's predecessor as a walk-on place kicker for the otherwise all-
male football team. Barnett was coach by the time she got to Boulder,
and he set the tone for most of the treatment she received. Her father
complained both to the coach and the Athletic Director about the con-
stant sexual harassment of her by other players. After the 2001 gang-
rapes became public, Ms. Hnida felt compelled to come forward about
being raped by another player on the team.
32
28. Appellants' Opening Brief (Redacted), at 18-19, Simpson v. Univ. of Colo., No. 06-
1184 (10th Cir. Aug. 18, 2006).
29. Id. at 15, 18, 25.
30. Appellants' Opening Brief, supra note 28, at 18.
31. Appellants' Reply Brief (Redacted) at 12, Simpson v. Univ. of Colo., No. 06-1184
(10th Cir. Dec. 18, 2006).
32. KATIE HNIDA, STILL KICKING: MY JOURNEYS AS THE FIRST WOMAN TO PLAY DIVi-
SION I COLLEGE FOOTBALL 247-64 (2006). While Ms. Hinda's father had
complained about acts of sexual harassment against her, she didn't report the rape be-
cause she felt that it would get her kicked off the team. In any case, after a miserable
time at CU, and an interim at other schools, in 2002 Ms. Hnida transferred to the
University of New Mexico, where she played on the football team and received "an
immensely different reception." Id. at 216. She went on to become the first woman
to score in a NCAA Division I football game. Id. at 244. While I applaud Ms.
Hnida's courage, I have no opinion about whether gender integration of college foot-
[Vol. 15:205
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When Ms. Hnida went public, Coach Barnett became a bit of a
loose cannon. At a news conference concerning the entire football gang-
rape scandal and Ms. Hinda's report of rape, he said: "It was obvious
that Katie was not that good. She was awful, OK? You know what guys
do? They respect your ability .... Well, Katie was a girl, and not only
was she was a girl, she was terrible, OK, and there is no other way to say
it."33 "No other way to say" what? Could it have been that, when Coach
Barnett found a girl on his football team, it followed logically to him
that anything she had to say was a lie, and even if it wasn't a lie, it didn't
matter?
34
Katie Hnida was only a potential witness; the plaintiffs were the al-
leged victims of the December 2001 gang rape. Their sole cause of
action was Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, which pro-
hibits sex discrimination on the part of educational institutions that
receive federal funds. The District Court granted summary judgment to
the University of Colorado,35 in a remarkable football-protective opinion
(discussed infra.) The plaintiffs appealed, and oral argument was heard
by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals on May 7, 2007. In a quick turn-
around, the Court of Appeals reversed on September 6, 2007, holding
ball teams is a worthy goal. But see B. Glenn George, Fifty Fifty: Ending Sex Segrega-
tion in School Sports, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 1107, 1145-59 (2002) (arguing for gender
parity on all collegiate teams, including football).
33. Bill Pennington, Colorado Puts Football Coach on Leave, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2004,
at D1. In a remarkable Congressional Hearing in the midst of the CU revelations,
Congresswoman Janice D. Schakowsky argued that Coach Barnett's comments about
Katie Hnida were sufficient to disqualify him from the administrative leave with pay
that he had received during the internal investigation:
[T]hink of substituting the word "girl" for "black."[sic] Would we for a
minute tolerate that person to go on paid administrative leave? ... [W]e
should be serious about this remark, which I think goes beyond everything,
has crossed a line where if we are serious we have to say no, this person
cannot lead. He has disqualified himself.
College Recruiting: Are Student Athletes Being Protected?: Hearing Before the Subcom-
mittee on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection of the Committee on Energy and
Commerce, 108th Cong. 50 (2004) (statement of Rep. Janice D. Schakowsky, Mem-
ber, H. Comm. On Energy and Commerce).
34. Toward making that inference, consider this. Just prior to the news conference,
Coach Barnett e-mailed then-Colorado Athletic Director, Dick Tharp: "How aggres-
sive shoould [sic] I be re; Katie ... sexual conquests by her etc." HNIDA, supra note
32, at 255; also attached to Special Committee on Athletics Reform, Boulder Faculty
Assembly, A Proposal for Reform of Intercollegiate Athletics at the University of Colorado
at Boulder (May 4, 2004) (copy on file with author). Given that Ms. Hnida was not
suing CU, and that there had never been any controversy about Ms. Hnida's private
life, it appears that Coach Barnett was willing to invent a "slut defense" to Ms.
Hnida's evidence.
35. Simpson v. Univ. of Colo., 372 F. Supp. 2d 1229 (D. Colo. 2005).
20091
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that the evidence presented at summary judgment surely presented
genuine issues of material fact on Title IX standards. 6
The University of Colorado wisely decided against applying for cer-
tiorari," and, instead of airing its laundry at trial, settled with the two
plaintiffs on December 5, 2007 for a combined amount of
$2,850,000." On the same day, former Coach Barnett expressed his
dismay that the suit had held a great university "hostage" for so long. 9
Mr. Barnett did not mention that the amounts paid to the plaintiffs
were less than the University paid to him-$3,000,000-to buy him
out of his coaching contract at the end of the 2005 season, 0 a buy-out
that was more about losing football games than it was about sexual
abuse in his football program.4'
The Simpson decision, and a handful of other recent favorable Title
IX decisions (and settlements), may cause universities slowly to re-think
the relationships of central administrations to athletic departments. It
will be a hard slog for them, however, because of the power of athletic
departments.42 In the meantime, there are many flaws in Title IX that
36. Simpson v. Univ. of Colo., 500 F.3d 1170 (10th Cir. 2007).
37. Just weeks before the CU settlement, the United States Supreme Court had denied
certiorari in a case involving similar questions about proof in Tide IX sexual harassment
claims. Jennings v. Univ. of N.C, 482 F. 3d 686 (4th Cir. 2007) (en banc), cert. de-
nied 127 S. Ct. 247 (2007). In that matter, a UNC-Chapel Hill female soccer player
brought suit alleging that the team's head coach, Anson Dorrance, had created a hos-
tile environment by sexually harassing his players. As in Simpson, the District Court
granted summary judgment for the University, but the appellate court reversed, hold-
ing, inter alia, that a jury could find "the incidents were not isolated incidents, but
were part of an abusive pattern that instilled fear and dread." 482 F.3d at 698. Rather
than go to trial as scheduled in April 2008, UNC settled that matter for $385,000,
with an apology from the coach, and a review of its sexual harassment policy by an
outside expert. Brad Wolverton, U. of North Carolina Settles Sex-Harassment Suit
Against Coach, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., http://chronicle.com/daily/2008/0l/
1231 n.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2008).
38. Sara Burnett & Kevin Vaughn, CU Makes $2.85M Vow for Change; Barnett Responds,
Roce MOUNTAIN NEWS, Dec.6, 2007. The settlement funds came entirely from in-
surance. The University had already spent $3,000,000 on outside counsel, including
$1,000,000 from general university funds. Id.
39. Statement from Gary Barnett, Dec. 5, 2007, on Gary Barnett: The Official
Website, www.garybarnettfoundation.org, available at http://web.archive.org/web/
200712150246421http://www.garybarnettfoundation.org/.
40. Lee Jenkins, Losses Do to Barnett What Colorado Scandal Couldn't, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
9, 2005, at D6.
41. Id. In addition, Barnett had been given a one-year suspension-with pay-in re-
sponse to the investigation of the football program.
42. See, e.g., Associated Press, College Football: Spurrier Issues Threat to South Carolina,
SEATTLE TIMES, Aug. 7, 2007, at C5 (describing football coach's threat to quit be-
cause university admissions committee refused to admit two recruited athletes who
satisfied minimum NCAA standards).
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make Simpson something of a hollow victory. What I describe are the
legal fortifications around college football and the devaluation of its vic-
tims. In order to understand what is going on here, and what might be
done about it, we need to take a brief look at the history of college foot-
ball.
B. American College Football
College football is a truly American institution. It is a paradigm
product of a "recreational ideology"43 that tracks gender anxieties in the
United States, particularly since the Civil War. There are unique features
of U.S. intercollegiate athletics, and football in particular, that underlie
my approach." First, what in the U.S. we call "football" is of course dis-
tinguished from what the rest of the world calls "football," and we call
"soccer." This game-which is itself a fascinating study in "American
exceptionalism ,4-was invented on U.S. college campuses. Second, as
has often been noted, the United States is the only country in the world
where intercollegiate athletics are so thoroughly part of and funded by
universities.46 Because of the massive scale and gender apartheid
43. See ELLIOTT J. Go, N & WARREN GOLDSTEIN, A BRIEF HISTORY OF AMERICAN
SPORTS 6 (Univ. Ill. Press 2004).
44. My approach begins with my affection for college football. I grew up in a small
Oklahoma town. Both my parents and many family members attended the Univer-
sity of Oklahoma. When I was little, my father took me to OU football games, and I
still recall the thrill of being dressed in a red jumpsuit on cool fall days and belting
out "Oklahoma"-let's face it, the best state song ever-in a chorus of about 60,000
people (the capacity of Oklahoma Memorial Stadium is now much greater). The
story goes that Rogers and Hammerstein could have written that musical about any
Midwestern state, but none other had such a musical name. Oklahoma-a Choctaw
word meaning "land of the red man." Where the wind comes sweeping down the
plain!
45. ANDREI S. MARKOVITZ & STEVEN L. HELLERMAN, OFFSIDE: SOCCER AND AMERICAN
EXCEPTIONALISM 70 (Princeton Univ. Press 2001). The original notion of "American
exceptionalism," which has been the subject of scholarly study for over a century,
concerns the absence of any European-style socialism or social democracy as a sys-
tematically important force in American politics. Id. at 7.
46. Id. at 42. Other countries now have organized intercollegiate athletics, though
small compared to the U.S. behemoth. See the links to intercollegiate governing
bodies in England, Ireland, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the Philippines
at www.dmoz.org/Sports/College-andUniversity/Goverinig-Bodies/desc.html. Of
course, sports in general are extraordinary in the U.S. in several important ways.
"In their institutional presence and their culture, American sports are like Ameri-
can education and American religion: independent of the state, market driven, and
ultimately subject to few, if any, regulating bodies outside those of their own crea-
tion." MARKOVITZ & HELLERMAN, supra note 45, at 46.
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represented by football, it is a particularly telling lens through which to
view the priorities of many institutions of higher education. Third,
while there is an ostensible multi-layered system of control, the fact is
that those layers combine to produce a symphony of no control, particu-
larly when it comes to injuries done to women. Though no one has a
clear claim to inventing the game, 41 U.S. college football has a deeply
elite pedigree. From the early 19th century, the students at the all male
Ivy League universities were playing both soccer and rugby.48 Rules for
those two games had not really been set in the U.S., and variations
emerged. Harvard students had developed a hybrid of the kicking game
and the hands-on game, known then as "the Boston game." During
these decades, and until the turn of the century, the games and
rule-evolution were all under student control. Football in several forms
became an Ivy League mania after the Civil War. By the 1870's, the col-
leges were hot for intercollegiate competition, which required
standardized rules for standardized games. After the war, representatives
from the Ivy League colleges met to do just that. But Harvard didn't
show up.
Most historians consider this meeting the critical moment in the
invention of American football. The other schools would have pushed
for a more soccer-like game. Harvard would have nothing but "the Bos-
ton game." Harvard's hold-out provoked the Ivy League to adopt the
Boston game as the intercollegiate model. Thereafter, the schools par-
ticipated in a general evolution toward increased violence in what had
become known as "American football." The emergence of the sport was
characterized by an ideology of raw aggression and free-for-all violence.49
47. People have been kicking roundish objects around at least since people have been
writing down their observations of what other people did. For example, in 1620,
English colonists found Native Americans playing "pasuckquakkohowog," translat-
able as "they gather to play football," a game performed by entire villages on playing
surfaces often a mile long. Id. at 69. It is very likely, however, that the recreational
ideology of such activities-probably conscious purification rituals-was rather dif-
ferent from modern-day football. See GoRN AND GOLDSTEIN, supra note 43, at 5.
48. See ALLEN GUTrMANN, FROM RITUAL To REcoRD: THE NATURE OF MODERN SPORT
127-28 (1978). The story is that rugby came into being in 1823 at Rugby School in
Warwickshire, England (memorialized there by a plaque) when William Webb Ellis
picked up the soccer ball and ran with it, "in bold defiance of the rules." Id. at 127.
49. The embrace of aggression was consistent with a history of "blood-sports," from
cockfighting to rat-baiting to dog-fighting, that were associated with masculinity in
the United States from colonial times. As sports historians Elliott Gorn and Warren
Goldstein note:
In their very violence and competitiveness, sports united men with displays
of masculine power. The swagger of a man who played in bloody football
games, or even the strut of one who, with a large wager, identified himself
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The Victorian era brought significant changes in recreational ideol-
ogy. Early Victorians opposed virtually all recreational activities (from
horse racing to boating to storytelling) on moral grounds, and their no-
tion of manly virtue was not infused with primal aggression. But the
growing sports culture and commercialization of sports in the United
States, aided by steam-powered printing, telegraphy, and the penny
press, proved irrepressible.0 A journalistic backlash mocked Victorian
sentimentality, boxing became the most popular spectator sport, and
there arose a bachelor subculture of extreme sports violence, defined by
contravention of law and custom. Professors Gorn and Goldstein de-
scribe an urban underground of thousands of young men who migrated
among various venues to engage in bare-knuckled fighting, ending when
a man simply couldn't continue.
5'
This divided front of masculinity could not continue. Before the
Civil War, Victorian men began to articulate their own recreational ide-
ology, what Gorn and Goldstein call the ideology of "muscular
Christians and brawny Brahmins. ''52 Their emphasis on proper sports,
properly played by proper men, built a conception of masculinity that
emphasized competitiveness, teamwork, and control over their envi-
ronment. These muscular Christians and brawny Brahmins could create
what they viewed as inevitable military and industrial might.53 But it was
after the Civil War-"in the belief that conflict between individuals,
classes, and nations lay at the heart of human existence"-that the pre-
sent ideology of sports came into being.54 It was then that college
football saved American masculine honor.
Sports as "the moral equivalent of war" became a popular notion by
the 1890's. 55 "Athletics offered an opportunity for young men to get
with a particular fighting cock, were emblems of manhood that excluded
women, children, the elderly .... Extravagant risks, unflinching bloodi-
ness, competition bordering on madness-these were at the core of the
sporting life. Sports helped define the terms of admission to male groups,
valorized particular male traits of masculine virility, and thereby devalued
all that was womanly and feminine.
GoRN & GOLDSTEIN, supra note 43, at 15, 28.
50. See id. at 59-67.
51. Id. at 71-72. In short, Gorn and Goldstein describe a real historical antecedent to the
novel Fight Club, and to the 1999 cult classic movie by the same name, that has pro-
voked much discussion about misogyny and the worship of anarchic violence. See
generally CHUCK PALAHNIUK, FIGHT CLUB (1996); FIGHT CLUB (20th Cent. Fox
1999).
52. Gom, & GOLDSTEIN, supra note 43, at 81.
53. Id. at 88.
54. Id. at 99.
55. Id. at 140.
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their first taste of glory, and for older men to renew the tingle of heroic
combat." 6 The football stadium at Harvard, "Soldiers' Field," was
named for Harvardians killed in the Civil War.57 Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr., in his 1895 speech at Harvard, explicitly endorsed the pos-
sibility of filling existential emptiness with a "Soldier's Faith" (the title of
his speech), with "obedience to blindly accepted duty." With no battles
at hand, Holmes argued that rugged sports could be an adequate substi-
tute, a means to feel "the passion of life at its top.,,
58
With this reconstructed sports ideology-an ideology compatible
with patriotism and the emerging industrial economy-dangerous
sports became the means of American male renewal. Though women
were beginning to play a few organized sports at the college level, specta-
tor sports became a largely male-segregated space, a site for worship of
virile heroes. "What, after all, was left to do after the wilderness was
tamed, fortunes made, and rebellions put down?",
5
1
In the meantime, though Harvard had won the day on the original
form of American football, it was Yale that built college football into the
juggernaut that we know today. Walter Camp, associated with Yale foot-
ball from 1876-1909 (first as a player and finally as head coach), has
become known as the "father of college football., 60 Under his leadership,
the scrimmage was established, downs became the standardized meas-
urement of progress, and ever-more violent means of blocking and
tackling were normalized.6' During Camp's association with college
football, his teams lost only fourteen games, a record that has never
come close to being matched.
62
But the legendary Camp was most successful as a propagandist for
football. Most dramatically, he was the man who rescued college football
in the "crisis year," 1905. With increasing violence in the sport, casual-
ties also increased. President Theodore Roosevelt-surely the butchest of
56. Id.
57. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Soldier's Faith, (May 30, 1895) in RIcHARD Pos-
NER, THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES (1992), available at http://www.harvardregiment.org/
holmesfa.htm.
58. Id. It is said that this speech was instrumental in persuading President Theodore
Roosevelt to nominate Holmes to the United States Supreme Court. The Soldier's
Faith, http://www.harvardregiment.org/holmesfa.htm (1998).
59. GoRN & GOLDSTEIN, supra note 43, at 145, 143.
60. Id. at 153, 156.
61. Id. at 155.
62. Id. at 156. Camp was also a clockmaker, and was obsessed with the mathematics of
football. He bureaucratized the game, and the present preoccupation with football
statistics leads directly back to Walter Camp. He modeled his teams on the standards
of industrial production, based on the work of reformers such as Frederick Winslow
Taylor. Id. at 159-61.
[Vol. 15:205
STUDENT GLADIATORS AND SEXUAL ASSAULT
U.S. Presidents-had become so disgusted with the sport that he threat-
ened federal action to reform or abolish it (the story goes that the
President had seen photographs of the body of a Swarthmore player who
had been beaten to a bloody pulp). Roosevelt called representatives of
several colleges to the White House to confer about what should be
done. Camp is credited with striking the mild compromise that Roose-
velt accepted. 6' There are various accounts of how the "crisis" went
down, but everyone agrees that it resulted in only modest reforms, rule
consolidation, and the promise of self-regulation. The self-regulation
compromise led to the establishment in 1910 of what we now know as
the National Collegiate Athletic Association."
There is no shortage of literature on how football became America's
most popular sport in the late 20th Century. Having begun it, the Ivy
League pulled out of the athletic arms race early on. Large state universi-
ties quickly emerged as the major competitors for dominance (along
with some notably consistent private contenders, such as Notre Dame).
That shift, commensurate with enormous state and federal investments
in "land-grant" universities, is not only part of a narrative about the de-
mocratization of education and the provision of loci for regional and
local allegiances. It is also a forgetting of elite origins, yet another mira-
cle of transferring loyalties from the elite to the masses.
For my purposes, the next crucial chapter in the history of college
football was the enactment of Title IX in 1972. The import of that stat-65
ute is to prohibit sex discrimination in educational programs receiving
federal funds, a group of programs that includes almost all colleges in
the United States. Sports were not primarily on the minds of the Con-
gress that enacted Title IX, but they quickly emerged as a huge issue.
Intense lobbying by the NCAA, among other groups, sought to exclude
intercollegiate sports, particularly football, from coverage under Title
IX's requirement of equality in educational programs. Most famously, in
1974, Senator John Tower introduced amendments that attempted,
first, to exempt all intercollegiate athletics from Title IX's coverage, and
then, to exempt revenue-producing sports. The exemptions did not pass.
The winning strategy was the Javits Amendment, which passed the buck
to the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare to prepare
63. Id. at 157-58.
64. Id. at 105, 131-65.
65. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (2008). The primary command is as follows: "No person
in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education pro-
gram or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 20 U.S.C. § 16 81 (a).
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implementing regulations for intercollegiate athletics with "reasonable
provisions considering the nature of particular sports. 66
Those regulations made college football possible within the law.
They allow colleges to offer sex-segregated teams when the sports in-
volved were "contact sports." There is no accompanying obligation for
institutions to offer a team in those sports for the other sex or to allow
for the other sex to try out for the sex-segregated teams in the "contact
,,67
sports.
There have been several subsequent efforts, specifically by the Col-
lege Football Association and the American Football Coaches
Association, to get special legal treatment for their sport under Title IX.
In 1994-95, those efforts were supported by then-Representative Den-
nis Hastert, a former high-school wrestling and football coach who later
became Speaker of the House, who said that, "[f]ootball is unique ....
I do not want to take on a national shrine. 68 Those efforts failed.
Recently, President George W Bush and a Republican-controlled
Congress initiated a review of Title IX. Many suspected that the intent
was to dismantle Title IX, but the effort did not get very far. The Com-
mission to Review Title IX, as a political matter, could not be comprised
merely of opponents. It included prominent female athletes and other
pro-Title IX experts. The Commission's report came out in favor of re-
taining almost all existing aspects of Title X9-the successes of Title IX
for women athletes were just too spectacular.
II. WHAT DOESN'T WORK
This Article is about efforts to insulate college football from the
rule of law, one way or another. Those efforts have contributed to mak-
66. Education Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-380, § 844, 88 Stat. 484, 612
(1974). For excellent histories of Title IX, see ELLEN J. VARGYAS, BREAKING DOWN
BARRIERS: A LEGAL GUIDE TO TITLE IX (1994); Diane Heckman, Scoreboard: A Con-
cise Chronological Twenty-Five Year History of Title IX Involving Interscholastic and
Intercollegiate Athletics, 7 SETON HALLJ. SPORT L. 391 (1997); and Deborah Brake &
Elizabeth Catlin, The Path of Most Resistance: The Long Road Toward Gender Equity
in Intercollegiate Athletics, 3 DUKE J. GENDERL. & POL'Y 51 (1996).
67. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(a)-(b) (2000). "For the purpose of this section, contact sports
include boxing, wrestling, rugby, ice hockey, football, basketball and other sports the
purpose or major activity of which involves bodily contact."
68. Alexander Wolff & Richard O'Brien, eds., Scorecard: The Third Sex, SPORTS ILLUS-
TRATED 15 (Feb. 6, 1995) (quoting Dennis Hastert (R.-Il.)).
69. U.S. Department of Education, Secretary of Education's Commission on Opportu-
nity in Athletics, Open to All Title IX at Thirty, (Feb. 28, 2003) available at
http://www.ed.gov/about/bdscomm/list/athletics/title9report.pdf.
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ing football the hegemonic sport in a "hegemonic sports culture." By
the latter term, borrowed from Professor Andrei Markovitz, I mean a
culture that understands itself through sports that very few actually play.
Much is at stake, particularly as it is possible that "love of, loyalty for,
and identification with one's team remains arguably the only emotional
constant in one's life (particularly for men). 70 On the collegiate level, it
could be seen as an affirmative action program for the devotees (because
of such disproportionate resources devoted to it).7 ' It is not analyzed as
such; instead it has been treated as inevitable, as part of nature, as some-
thing without which U.S. higher education would be unimaginable.
What would it take to stop violence by male college athletes against
women? From a U.S. legal point of view, there are essentially four ave-
nues of relief. They are NCAA remedies,72 criminal justice remedies,
athletic department and university remedies, and civil litigation reme-
dies.
A. The National Collegiate Athletic Association
There are several organizations that govern college athletics, but the
National Collegiate Athletic Association is by far the largest and most
powerful. The NCAA has a range of powerful and unilaterally imposed
remedies for violations of its extraordinarily detailed rules. These penal-
ties range from giving public warnings, to removing individual player
eligibility for one or more seasons, to reducing the number of athletic
scholarships an institution may award for one or more seasons, to pro-
hibiting bowl eligibility for one or more seasons, to blocking television
broadcast access, to what those in the business call the "death penalty"-
excluding an institution's team from association play for one or more
73seasons.
70. MARKOVITZ & HELLERMAN, supra note 45, at 10-11, 18.
71. For example, in 2006, the University of Colorado at Boulder fielded 17 teams (in-
cluding both men's and women's teams), yet 26% of the athletes were football
players, and 59% of athletic operating expenses went to the football team. Report of
the University of Colorado pursuant to the Equity in Athletics Disclosure Act,
http://ope.ed.gov/athletics/Index.aspx (follow "Get data for one institution" hyper-
link and search for "University of Colorado at Boulder").
72. For simplicity's sake, I have not separated inter-conference and intra-conference
remedies out from NCAA remedies. My investigation has not revealed any rules pro-
posed by any athletic conference to control sexual assault that are bolder than
anything yet proposed by the NCAA.
73. The "death penalty" is imposed when a school's athletic department commits serious
infractions while already on probation. The NCAA has only imposed the modern
"death penalty" once, against the Southern Methodist University football program
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No educational institution has to be part of the NCAA, nor part of
any particular division of the NCAA. As the above litany of powers in-
dicates, however, it is hazardous for a sports-heavy institution to thwart
the NCAA. But membership is a something of a Faustian bargain. Divi-
sion IA membership in particular requires significant resources in the
form of athletic department and faculty participation in Association
committees and on-campus compliance systems. NCAA membership
takes-or at least seems to take-significant athletic governance out of
faculty hands, and many educators wonder what membership actually
provides in return.
Whereas the origins of the NCAA were largely rooted in concerns
about the brutality of football,74 the NCAA has increasingly concerned
itself with the industry of collegiate athletics: making and distributing
(in large part, to itself) the enormous revenues young bodies at play can
generate. To make the wheels of the industry turn, the NCAA expends
enormous effort to regulate competition, to keep it plausibly fair from
season to season by establishing levels of membership, numbers of
scholarships, recruitment policies, and even academic standards, again,
to an enormously detailed degree. The faculty and administrators who
distrust the "self-regulation" of college athletics by the NCAA can be
forgiven their skepticism. There is much about the NCAA that makes it
look like a trade organization for coaches and athletic directors, regulat-
ing competition for the sake of business, rather than for the benefit of
athletes or for any larger educational goals, normalizing pronounce-
ments notwithstanding.75
My distrust is informed by the fact that the NCAA has no rules
prohibiting either sexual harassment or sexual assault by college athletes,
nor any remedies against athletes, or more importantly, against institu-
tions when athletic programs present risks of sexual misconduct. Thus,
the NCAA did not investigate either the December 2001 events or any
or the prior allegations of sexual harassment and assault against the Uni-
versity of Colorado football program.76 Since the Colorado meltdown,
for failing to discover and then failing to prevent cash payments by "boosters" to
football players. As a result, SMU lost fifty-five scholarship positions, was banned
from bowl games and television in 1988 and 1989, and was precluded from hiring a
full complement of assistant coaches. Because of these disabilities, SMU elected to
cancel the 1987-88 seasons. See Kate Hairopoulos, Orsini: SMU Close to Turning
Corner, DALLAS MORNING NEWS (Feb. 25, 2007).
74. See supra text accompanying notes 63-64.
75. GORN & GOLDSTEIN, supra note 43, at 230-31.
76. That is not to say that the NCAA is entirely ignoring the excesses of the CU athletic
department. Recently, the NCAA punished CU for giving too much and/or better
food to non-elite athletes. According to NCAA rules, non-scholarship athletes ("walk-
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the NCAA has adopted stricter rules for recruiting trips, but nothing for
sexual assault as such.77 The new recruitment rules have to do with an
unfair (and incidentally illegal) competitive advantage that an institution
might get by providing booze, drugs, and lap-dancers to a hot prospect.
Sexual assault falls within an area that the NCAA apparently feels to be
outside its jurisdiction.
As explained above, the NCAA has extraordinary powers, so if it
had rules against sexual assault, they would be highly significant. The
association's failure to have such rules should cause close examination of
that central conceit of college athletics, the "student-athlete." The entire
structure of intercollegiate athletics operates on the notion of amateur-
ism, by which the real money-makers-the athletes-do not get paid
other than by scholarships. Scholarships include room and board, some-
times in handsome packages, but in essence mean free tuition to a
university. In theory, the athletes are there, first and foremost, to learn.
Parenthetically, referring back to my old-fashioned ideas about the
educational mission of universities, I have a broad vision of what college
athletes have the opportunity to learn. They can learn physical disci-
pline, and the mental acuity it brings, at a level most people cannot
imagine. They can learn the intellectual lessons of teamwork and
strategy-lessons that others may have brought into high theory but
ons") pay more for meal plans than ordinary students. Colorado allowed 133 walk-
ons in six athletic programs to eat at the "training table"-the exclusive and copious
trough for scholarship athletes-for five years without paying the increased fee. The
University will pay a fine of $100,000, will be on probation for two years, and will
lose one football scholarship a year for three years. Joel A. Erickson, CU Fined
$100,000 For Undercharging Athletes, DENVER POST (June 21, 2007).
77. The NCAA bylaws require member schools to develop their own policies prohibiting
the use of drugs, alcohol, sex, and gambling for recruiting purposes and restricting
unchaperoned activities for recruits. Division I Management Council Endorses New
Rules for Recruiting Student Athletes, available at http://www.ncaa.org/wps/ncaa?
ContentlD=10 119 (July 20, 2004). They are substantially the same changes in re-
cruiting that President Elizabeth Hoffman of the University of Colorado system
imposed after the football scandal broke. Preliminary Action Plan for the Reorganiza-
tion and Oversight of Intercollegiate Athletics, available at www.colorado.edu/
news/statements/athletics/reforms/reforms.html (May 27, 2004). ("Recruits already
are prohibited from using alcohol or drugs. They also are specifically prohibited from
attending private parties or entering bars or strip clubs."). The recruitment rules were
finalized in slightly amended form in June of 2006. University of Colorado at Boulder
Policy on Recruitment of Prospective Student-Athletes, available at http://
www.cubuffs.com/pdf4/81977.pdfDB-OEMID=600 (under "Recruitment Pol-
icy"). In spite of accomplishing these changes, President Hoffmann resigned the
university presidency, in large part because of the football fiasco. Kevin Vaughan,
Todd Hartman, & John C. Ensslin, Hoffman Steps Down From CU Presidency My
Role as the Leader of the University Has Become an Issue, RocKy MOUNTAIN NEWS,
Mar. 8, 2005, at 4A.
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may have never experienced themselves. Athletes may have moments of
transcendence that will take them outside of Plato's cave. All of that and
the academic curriculum are available to them. There are so many op-
portunities to escape narrowness and the urge to violence and unreal
loyalties, but only if the athletes themselves are not used and abused.
Further in this parenthetical meditation, though the NCAAs duties
don't extend to other students, when the athletes' educational experi-
ences are twisted as they are in the current system, to the extent that
athlete sexual violence becomes protected by institutions, all students'
educational opportunities are potentially thwarted.
I do not address any of this cynically, and I greatly admire those
athletes who achieve academically, given the astonishing burdens of
team participation. But everyone knows that big-time sports teams at
big-time sports universities struggle perpetually with the academic eligi-
bility of recruits and team members. The NCAA has always been a
central site of that struggle, and is undertaking a more ambitious pro-
gram to deal with it.
In 2004, the NCAA established the "Academic Progress Rate" sys-
tem. The rates are highly indexed according to many factors, and the
detailed rules are still being tinkered with. Basically, though, the NCAA
will assert its powers when academic standards are not met for four
classes of actors: recruits (with respect to initial eligibility for scholar-
ships), present student-athletes (with respect to continued scholarship
and/or playing eligibility), transferring student-athletes, and most im-
portantly, educational institutions whose scholarship athletes do not
collectively maintain certain academic standards over a period of time.
The penalties are the same as those the NCAA may impose for other
rule infractions: everything from public notice to, in "extreme cases,"
dissociation from the NCAA.78 Two hundred or so mild penalties have
been imposed against institutions under this new system, a vast majority
of them against men's sports programs."
Why not, along with an "Academic Progress Rate," a "Violence
Prevention Index" imposed by the NCAA? Such an initiative would
amount to facing the correspondence between athletics in general and
violence in athletics as an unconstrained competitive good. It would
require embracing the educational values in big-time athletics-of
which there are many-and perhaps putting those values above "win-
78. NCAA Board of Directors Adopts Landmark Academic Reform Package, (Apr. 29,
2004), available at http://www.ncaa.org/releases/divi/2004/2004042901dl.htm.
79. Academic Reform-Penalty Lists, (2007-2008), available at http://www.ncaa.org/
wps/ncaa?ContentID=3694 (penalties organized according to severity, institution, and
specific sports).
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ning," or even re-defining what "winning" is. The "student-athlete" is
not a man who rapes and gets away with it.
B. The Criminal Justice System
The criminal justice system is the proverbial red herring in much of
this debate. Women in or around colleges cannot depend on it. Allega-
tions of rape or sexual assault against college athletes seldom result in
prosecution, for the same reason that 98% of reported rapes in general
aren't prosecuted: the defendant has at least semi-cordially met the vic-
tim before the crime.
That is the acquaintance rape problem. It is the reason no sex
crimes were charged against the athletes at the University of Colorado.
The Boulder County District Attorney declined to press sexual assault
charges against the football players and recruits due to the "many diffi-
culties frequently encountered in prosecutions of acquaintance rape. 
,81
It didn't matter that the alleged rapists didn't actually know the victims;
the alleged rapists had been invited into the victims' apartment (though
not by the victims themselves). That is the seemingly intractable story-
she wanted it or might have wanted it, and she can't prove that she
didn't.
But the criminal justice system has an enormous impact upon how
colleges and the public view alleged violence by college athletes. The
important thing that universities and the public seem unable to keep in
mind is that crimes require proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Eligibility
decisions in college sports, and sponsorship decisions by universities,
carry no such burden. The NCAA carries minimum academic and con-
duct standards for athletes, and institutions and particular athletic
programs can impose much more stringent standards on athletes if they
choose to. But institutions need clarity and consistency in their policies
for dealing with criminal charges against student-athletes. As it is,
80. Keith Coffman, CU Players Avoid Rape Charges, DENVER POST (Apr. 28, 2002)
(quoting Boulder County District Attorney Mary Keenan). Instead, the four CU
players faced a felony charge of contribution to the delinquency of a minor (for giv-
ing alcohol and marijuana to the recruits). Two of the players pled guilty to lesser
charges and were given a deferred sentence of 18 months in addition to 36 hours of
community service. Owen S. Good, Four Booked in Wild Welcome for CU Recruits,
RocK MOUNTAIN NEWS (May 1, 2002). In 2004, then Colorado Governor Bill
Owens appointed then state Attorney General (now United States Senator) Ken Sala-
zar to serve as a special prosecutor to examine all of the recruiting scandal evidence.
After several months of review, Mr. Salazar declined to file any new charges. Kevin
Vaughan, No CU Charges: Salazar Cites Evidence Concerns, Reluctance of Women to
Proceed, RocKy MOUNTAIN NEWS, May 12, 2004, at 4A.
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university policies allow enormous-too much-discretion to universi-
ties if criminal charges have been filed. And such policies are wildly
inconsistent across universities.81
The Mike Nifong/Duke Lacrosse story looms large here. In 2006,
some white members of Duke University's male lacrosse team hired a
female African-American stripper to entertain them at a private resi-
dence where several of the players lived. She alleged that they raped her.
The University cancelled the team's season and fired the coach.82 Then
Durham County District Attorney Mike Nifong got indictments against
three lacrosse players. Eventually, the charges were dropped for lack of
evidence. It turned out that the prosecutor had withheld exculpatory
evidence from the defense and lied to the court about it. He also had
made inflammatory statements to the press. Though many North Caro-
linians adopted a wait-and-see attitude," several groups in various sub-
communities took extreme positions on both sides of the case from the
outset. When the prosecution's lack of evidence and wrongdoing became
clear,84 not only were the cases dismissed but, after publicly apologizing,
81. Under the code of student conduct at CU, engaging in non-consensual sexual behav-
ior requires a minimum sanction of suspension, "unless specific and significant
mitigating factors are present." Office of Judicial Affairs, Univ. of Colo. at Boulder,
Student Conduct Code Policies and Procedures 2006-2007, § G(4) (Aug. 21, 2006).
Investigations and proceedings may be stayed pending criminal proceedings at the
discretion of the "conduct officer" in charge. Id. § C(3). By contrast, the Arizona
State University policy requires automatic suspension for athletes charged with felo-
nies, but prior to any charge, allows the Athletic Director to preliminarily suspend an
athlete when there is reasonable cause to believe a felony was committed. Gil B.
Fried, Illegal Moves Off-the-Field: University Liability for Illegal Acts of Student Athletes,
7 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 69, 93 (1997).
82. Due to the hardship inflicted on the team after cancellation of the 2006 season, the
Duke lacrosse program applied to the NCAA for an extra year of eligibility for some
of its players. When the NCAA granted eligibility to five fifth-year seniors, Duke be-
came the overwhelming favorite to win the NCAA Division I lacrosse championship.
Pete Thamel, For Duke, Extra Year of Players' Eligibility Makes a Difference, N.Y.
TIMES, May 10, 2008. Though Duke made it to the final four, the team lost to Johns
Hopkins in the semi-finals, and Hopkins lost to Syracuse in the championship game.
Jim Clark & Rich Thompson, NCAA Lacrosse Championship Notebook, BOSTON
HERALD, May 27, 2008.
83. See, e.g., Hal Crowther, Sympathy for the Devils?, INDEP. (Raleigh, N.C.) June 23,
2006, at 22, 23 ("At this stage, decency dictates a perfect neutrality about who may
be telling the truth.").
84. Professor Robert Mosteller has provided a careful statement of the case and an analy-
sis of all the legal issues involved as of 2007. Robert P. Mosteller, The Duke Lacrosse
Case, Innocence, and False Identification: A Fundamental Failure to "Do Justice, " 76
FoR, DHAM L. Rav. 1337 (2007).
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the DA was disbarred,85 spent a night in jail for contempt of court, and
now faces massive civil liability8
6 and possible criminal indictment. 
87
To have been in North Carolina for any part of that saga, as I was,
is to have had a sense that the former DA was taking the brunt of mul-
tiple harms, frustrations, and anxieties. 8 Unhappily, too many other
District Attorneys around the country have overstated their cases before
the press, or failed to turn over exculpatory evidence, or lied to a court,
or "pandered" on the bases of race or class to secure re-election. It would
be wonderful if the Nifong case prompted greater national vigilance in
such matters. In the meantime, Nifong's demise had more than a whiff
85. For a dear-headed analysis of Mr. Nifong's many unethical acts, see Robert P.
Mosteller, Exculpatory Evidence, Ethics, and the Road to the Disbarment of Mike Ni-
fong: The Critical Importance of Full Open-File Discovery, 15 GEO. MASON L. REv.
257 (2008).
86. The three originally accused players have sued ten defendants, including Nifong and
the City of Durham, under multiple civil rights causes of action. Matt Dees & Joseph
Neff, Civil Suit in Lacrosse Case Filed, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Oct. 6,
2007. The day that his answer was due, Nifong filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy, and
in January of 2008 the judge ordered Nifong dropped from the civil suit pending
disposition of the bankruptcy proceeding. The next month, a bankruptcy administra-
tor filed a statement indicating that Nifong was not financially eligible and that his
filing should be "presumed to be an abuse" of the bankruptcy option. As of this writ-
ing, the bankruptcy matter has not been resolved. Anne Blythe, Administrator: Nifbng
Too Rich for Bankruptcy, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Feb. 19, 2008. In the
"piling on" department, now thirty-eight former Duke lacrosse players who were not
indicted have fded suit against Duke University, its president, and twenty-seven other
defendants. Nifong is not yet a defendant, pending resolution of the bankruptcy mat-
ter. These thirty-eight former players' claims are for emotional distress caused by the
entire saga. Anne Blythe & Barbara Barrett, 38-Player Lacrosse Suite Gets Fanfare: The
Group's Action Against Duke is Laid Out in the Nation's Capital with Major Exposure,
NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Feb. 22, 2008.
87. See, e.g., Joseph Kennedy, Prosecuting the Prosecutor: Did the DA in the Duke Lacrosse
Case Commit a Crime?, SLATE, Apr. 13, 2007, http://www.slate.com/id/2164061/. As
of this writing, no state criminal charges have been brought, but the federal Depart-
ment of Justice has declined to proceed. Associated Press, North Carolina: US Will
Not Investigate Nifbng, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2007, at A28.
88. A number of well publicized and widely sold books recount Mr. Nifong's misdeeds
and the Duke community's "political correctness" in painful detail. See, e.g., NADER
BAYDOUN & R. STEPHANIE GOOD, A RUSH TO INJUSTICE: How POWER, PREJUDICE,
RACISM, AND POLITICAL CORRECTNESS OVERSHADOWED TRUTH AND JUSTICE IN THE
DUKE LACROSSE RAPE CASE (2007); STUART TAYLOR & KC JOHNSON, UNTIL PROVEN
INNOCENT: POLITICAL CORRECTNESS AND THE SHAMEFUL INJUSTICES OF THE DuKE
LACROSSE RAPE CASE (2007); DON YAEGER WITH MIKE PRESSLER, IT'S NOT ABOUT
THE TRUTH: THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE DUKE LACROSSE CASE AND THE LIVES IT
SHATTERED (2007).
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of piling on. As the New York Times put it, "Mr. Nifong's punishment
has assumed a severity rare in cases of prosecutorial misconduct."89
I abhor prosecutorial misconduct, and I do not blame the Duke
players for wanting to vindicate their reputations and recoup their at-
torneys' fees. I've despaired because the Duke lacrosse case has had a
regressive effect in the discourse about sexual assault, turning against
feminists who care about and work against sexual assault by athletes.
Journalist Kathleen Parker called it "Feminism's Shame," claiming that
Nifong's wrongdoing may have "set the stage" for actual guilty parties to
walk free. As an illustration, Ms. Parker describes a case subsequent to
the Duke case, in which an alleged rape by a college baseball player of an
intoxicated 17-year old which resulted in no charges being filed. Ms.
Parker said that, "[t]o any sane mind, a drunk, semi-conscious girl on
the receiving end of sexual intercourse doesn't sound like consensual sex,
yet the Santa Clara County district attorney decided not to pursue
charges."9°
Whoa. Victims of rape who have been drinking are, as a consistent
matter of fact, presumed to have consented. And the majority of rape
victims already didnt report well before Mike Nifong ever thought of
going to law school. I can't imagine why feminists should be ashamed of
that. What Ms. Parker might more accurately have said is that prosecu-
tors will hesitate even more in the future to bring charges against college
athletes, particularly those at elite universities such as Duke, because
they run the risk of being "Nifonged."
Before the Nifong meltdown, Duke had settled for an undisclosed
amount with the three players who had been indicted.9 The university's
decisions in the lacrosse case will be debated for years to come. What
seems clear is that when Duke found itself in that volatile situation, it
had no clear policies to follow, and no reliable guidelines for how it
should interact with the criminal justice system. Many universities are
still clueless about what to do when faced with allegations of sexual as-
sault by athletes. 92
89. Shalia Dewan, Duke Prosecutor Jailed; Students Seek Settlement, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8,
2007, at A8. See also David Feige, One-Off Offing: Why You Won't See a Disbarment
like Mike Nifong's Again, SLATE, June 28, 2007, http://www.slate.com/id/2168680/
("[Tlhe drama leaves prosecutorial misconduct commonplace, unseen, uncorrected,
and unpunished ... Nifong is a scapegoat.").
90. Kathleen Parker, Nifong's Legacy, Feminism's Shame, CHI. TiuB., June 20, 2007, at
21.
91. Dewan, supra note 89.
92. See David Moltz, Do They Ever Learn?, INSIDE HIGHER ED, July 28, 2008, http://
www.insidehighered.com/news/2008/07/28/harassment.
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The NCAA could help in formulating university policies, but fail-
ing that, universities have to come to grips with what they are going to
do when athletes-or any other students-are accused of sexual assault.
It must not matter whether or not criminal charges are filed. The crimi-
nal justice system is a separate system. Duke overreacted. CU
underreacted. Universities must take serious internal measures to protect
women from sexual harms. Universities should not let themselves be
caught up in, nor should they hide behind, the vicissitudes of the crimi-
nal law system.
C. Athletic Department and Institutional Discipline
As noted above, despite sexual assault by athletes being much in the
news, many Division I-A institutions do not have specific policies re-
garding those behaviors.93 In addition, as the reader can discern from the
newspaper accounts at the beginning of this Article, institutions have
widely varying responses to alleged sexual misbehavior by athletes.
Not surprisingly, institutions that have endured notorious instances
of sexual assault by athletes are more likely to have developed formal
policies to deal with such situations. For example, Virginia Tech's policy
contains mandatory ongoing education programs for athletes, continual
feedback on the program, suspensions for athletes upon being charged
with an offense, due process and appeals protections, and clear guide-
lines for aligning the athletic program with the general Virginia Tech
Code of Student Conduct.94 Of course, Virginia Tech was forced into
taking action after making a mess of a football gang-rape case that ended
up doing immeasurable harm to the cause of women in search of reme-
dies for sexual violence against them.
I'm speaking here of the decision of the United States Supreme
Court in United States v. Morrison,5 which by a five-four vote invali-
dated the provision of the Violence Against Women Act that provided a
federal civil action for victims of sexual violence. 6 The matter originated
93. Richard M. Southall, Good Start, The Bad, and Much Better: Three NCAA Intercolle-
giate Athletic Department Policy Responses to Criminal Behavior by College Athletes, 11
J. LEGAL ASPECTS OF SPORTS 269, 270 (2001).
94. See id. at 278-79.
95. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 606 (2000) (Congress lacked power under either
Commerce Clause or section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to enact civil rights
provision).
96. For a powerful indictment of the decision and analysis of its implications, see Catha-
rine A. MacKinnon, Disputing Male Sovereignty: On United States v. Morrison, 114
HARv. L. REv. 135 (2000).
20091
MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF GENDER & LAW
when a female Virginia Tech student was raped multiple times by two
Virginia Tech football players. The plaintiff did not report the rapes to
the police; nor did the university. At university hearings on the matter,
however, one of the players, Mr. Morrison, admitted to having sex with
her against her will.97 The university suspended him for two semesters.
Thereafter, in a tale of lack of clarity in policy and probable manipula-
tion by "legendary" football coach, Frank Beamer, the charge against
Morrison was reduced to "using abusive language." The sanction was
changed to suspension after graduation, and Morrison came back to
Virginia Tech on a full athletic scholarship. In the meantime, the plain-
tiff had already left Virginia Tech out of fear for her own safety.98 It was
only when she read in a newspaper that the sanctions against Morrison
had been effectively reversed that she decided to sue the two rapists and
the University on VAWA grounds. The rest, as they say, is history. After
the controversy, Virginia Tech adopted a fairly responsible policy (all
things being relative) regarding sexual assault by athletes. It was the least
they could do.
Consider, by contrast, the headstrong policies of the University of
Nebraska. Nebraska, like the University of Colorado, is a "Big XII" ath-
letic power. The NU athletic department developed a handbook for
student athletes that, in its 2000 version, codifies more than one rape
myth:
Be careful, especially if you have been drinking, that you do
not misread signals. Trouble has often occurred when a
woman has remained alone with several men after a drinking
party. While some may feel that this shows poor judgment on
the woman's part, it certainly does not justify rape.9
This provision in the football handbook apparently was developed
during the reign of Tom Osborne, who had been the "legendary" coach
of the Nebraska football team from 1973-97. After coaching, Osborne
served three terms as the Representative from Nebraska's 3rd Congres-
sional District (2001-07). While in Congress, he was asked to testify at
the Congressional hearing called in response to the CU revelations. 00
Osborne "wasn't real excited" to be there, but he went out of his way to
97. Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Institute, 132 F.3d 949, 955 (4th Cir. 1997).
98. Brzonkala, 132 F.3d at 954-56.
99. University of Nebraska 2000 AD publication p.2, quoted in Southall, supra note 93,
at 276. Professor Southall compares the Nebraska handbook overall to that of other
universities and calls it "a stark example of bad policy." Id.
100. Congressional Hearing, supra note 33 (testimony of Tom Osborne (R.-Neb.)).
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explain why misbehaviors in recruiting trips for all colleges were "iso-
lated instances."10'
Congressman and former Coach Osborne urged Congress not to
get involved in the problems of sexual assault and NCAA governance.
His reasoning is worth savoring: "It would be like having the Washington
Redskins come in here and write tax policy, I mean, you just don't under-
stand it. You know, you have to be there to know what to do."',
0 2
Coach Osborne knew what to do. For example, he allowed Law-
rence Philips to play at the University of Nebraska from 1993-96
despite a history of sexual assault and domestic violence. While at Ne-
braska, Philips brutally beat his girlfriend and dragged her down a flight
of stairs. Because Coach Osborne had free reign in disciplining his play-
ers-without any interference from those meddling Congresspersons or
advocates for women-he allowed Philips to continue to play for the
team. As Coach Osborne put it:
Lawrence and I have agreed on what happened, and there's no
question-I wouldn't call it a beating-but he certainly did in-
flict some damage to the young lady .... It wasn't a difficult
decision for me to make [to reinstate Philips] .... It's like go-
ing for two points against Miami in '83. It was something I
didn't have to think about.'13
Tom Osborne is not the only coach who has elevated football over
harm to women, and is surely not the only coach who thinks he can
agree with his player about "what happened" and have that be the end of
it.
A major issue here is athletic department control versus institu-
tional control. Generally, athletic departments want to keep the matter
as close to the vest as possible. That's generally a terrible way to deal
with sexual assault, as athletic departments are most keenly invested in
doing whatever it takes to keep players on the field. At CU, on the same
day that the Boulder County District Attorney announced that no
criminal sexual assault charges would be filed against the Colorado foot-
ball players for the 2001 incidents, then-head coach Gary Barnett said
101. Id. at 15-18.
102. Id. at 19 (emphasis added).
103. Christopher M. Parent, Personal Fouls: How Sexual Assault by Football Players is Expos-
ing Universities to Title IX Liability, 13 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.
617, 647-48. In the quote, Osborne refers to his decision to go for a two-point con-
version against the University of Miami in the 1984 Orange Bowl. The failure to
complete the conversion cost Nebraska the game. Michael Wilbon, Nebraska Falls
31-30 on Day of Upsets, WASH. POST (Jan. 2, 1984), at D1.
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that the matter would be handled internally. The four players did violate
team standards, he said, and would be disciplined.' °4 One player was
suspended for one game during the subsequent football season, four lost
their athletic scholarships for one semester,'0 5 and all were allowed to
play in the Fiesta bowl in the month following the December 2001
106events.
A few football coaches have seen that too much disciplinary power
in their hands is not good for them or their programs. But institutions
don't really want the disciplinary power either. When winning is every-
thing, neither coaches nor their athletic departments-nor really, their
institutions, so long as disciplinary rules are discretionary-should be
entrusted with deciding how to deal with sexual violence by athletes as
athletes. The simple answer is that there should be no exceptions for
athletes from any rules of student conduct.
D. Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972
Title IX prohibits educational institutions that receive federal funds
from engaging in sex discrimination. 7 This federal statute has been the
focus of much debate in the athletic context, particularly on two fronts.
First, it is falsely blamed for reducing athletic opportunities for men.'08
Second, there is much ado about how to measure student interest in
athletics under the three-part test for Title IX athletic compliance devel-
oped by the Department of Education. 19 I do not address those
problems in this Article. Nor will I address the fraught history of Title
IX, except as necessary.
104. Keith Coffman, CU Players Avoid Rape Charges, DENVER POST, Apr. 28, 2002, at B1.
It never became clear exactly which team standards the players violated.
105. Noted in Congressional Hearing, supra note 33.
106. Flores, supra note 13. The University of Oregon beat the University of Colorado in
the 2002 Fiesta Bowl by a score of 38-16. Joe Drape, Oregon States Case for Share of
Title, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 2002, at D1.
107. See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
108. See, e.g., Frank Deford, Annual Title IXAx Is About to Fall on Men's Sports, SI.coM,
May 2, 2007, http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2007/writers/frankdeford/05/02/
title.ix/index.html. But see Nancy Hogshead-Makar & Daniel R. Marburger, Is Title
IX Really to Blame for the Decline in Intercollegiate Men s Nonrevenue Sports?, 14
MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 65 (2003); Bill Pennington, Expectations Lose to Reality of Sports
Scholarships, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2008 at Al (only 2% of high school athletes get
any sort of athletic scholarships in college, and only those in "glamour sports" of
football and basketball can expect to get anything close to a full ride).
109. See B. Glenn George, Fifty/Fifty: Ending Segregation in School Sports, 63 OHIO ST. L.J.
1107, 1113-21 (2002).
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In the sexual assault context, Title IX provides a tempting cause of
action for three big reasons. First, sexual harassment (of which sexual
assault is a subset) is already judicially accepted as a form of sex dis-
crimination for which institutions may be financially liable. Second, a
conceivable punishment for violation of Title IX is the termination of
federal funding. It has never happened, but it is legally conceivable, and
without federal funding, most educational institutions would cease to
exist. The termination of federal funding is thus the mythical Damocles'
sword in the arsenal. Third, a judicial victory under Title IX allows the
plaintiff to recover attorneys' fees and costs, potentially very large sums
that may not be recoverable under other causes of action. The problems
are that the judicially-articulated standards for institutional liability are
incredibly high, and that the remedies are much too limited.
1. Title IX Standards for Institutional Liability
Most of the legal doctrines that inform the idea of sex discrimina-
tion in the Title IX educational context were first developed under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits sex discrimination
in employment. Our feminist heroines-clients and lawyers and schol-
ars alike-first had to get the courts to recognize that sexual harassment
was a matter of sex discrimination in the employment context, and to
recognize that such discrimination occurred not only when there was a
quidpro quo (for example, when keeping one's job depending on having
sex with one's boss), but when one's working environment was poisoned
by the oppressive sexualization of it.
The latter sort of discrimination came to be called "hostile working
environment" discrimination, and the United States Supreme Court
agreed in 1986 that it could be unlawful sex discrimination."' That was
only 22 years after Congress enacted Title VII (these things take time).
Title VII and Title IX were not on exactly parallel interpretive tracks,
but the courts did recognize that sexual harassment, including "hostile
educational environment" situations, should be actionable as sex dis-
crimination in education under Title IX.
The next effort was to get the courts to recognize that collective en-
tities, as well as individuals, could have liability as sexual harassers. In
the Title VII context, of course, that meant employers. In the Title IX
context, it meant educational institutions that receive federal funds. The
liability of the "higher-ups" is important for two obvious reasons. First,
when a plaintiff suffers damages, the individual harasser (particularly
110. Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
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when that person is a co-worker or a non-owner supervisor in the Title
VII context or a co-teacher, staff member, teacher, or co-student in the
Title IX context) is far less likely to have the resources to pay the dam-
ages (because far less likely to be suitably insured). Second, and usually
of more importance, the judgment will have more social impact when
rendered against the collective actors, because employers and institutions
are generally in a position to do something about the harassment. (And
if they don't do something immediately, their insurance companies will
eventually force them to.)...
In the glacial-movement-of-the-law department, it took only
thirty-four years from the enactment of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 for the Supreme Court to decide under what circumstances an
employer should be held liable for harassment of a worker by her super-
visor. In 1998, the Court said that an employer need not have specific
knowledge of the harassment. The employer will not be liable, however,
if the employer can show, as affirmative defenses, either that it had ade-
quate policies and procedures to protect against or remedy the
harassment, or that the employee unreasonably failed to avail herself of
those policies or procedures." 2 No one who has litigated in the sexual
harassment field thinks the Title VII standard for employer liability is
perfect, but notice two important features. First, as a general matter, the
employer needs to expect that harassment will occur in the workplace
and protect against it. Second, once the matter gets to court, the burden
is on the employer to show why it should not be liable.
In the same year that the Supreme Court decided the standard for
employer liability for sexual harassment under Title VII, it also decided
the standard for educational institutional liability under Title IX. In
contrast to Title VII, the Court made the standard for proving institu-
tional liability under Title IX much higher. In Gebser v. Lago Vista
Independent School District,"' by a five-to-four vote, the Court held that
schools are not liable for sexual harassment of a student by a teacher
unless school officials actually knew of the harassment and acted with
"deliberate indifference" to it.
111. Ann Scales, Nooky Nation: On Tort Law and Other Arguments from Nature, in Di-
RECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAw 307 (CATHARINE A. MAcKINNON & REVA B.
SIEGEL, EDS., 2004). For example, the settlement in Simpson v. Univ. of Colo., 160 F.
Supp. 2d 1033, and approximately $2,000,000 in University attorneys' fees, were
paid by insurers.
112. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998); Burlington Indus. v.
Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998).
113. Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274 (1998).
[Vot. 15:205
STUDENT GLADIATORS AND SEXUAL ASSAULT
A year later, in Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education,"4 the
Court made the standard even more difficult. In the context of student-
on-student harassment, the five Justice majority reinforced the "deliber-
ate indifference" to known harassment standard, and held further that
the school could be liable only where it exercises substantial control over
the harasser and the context where the harassment occurs. Further,
courts should not expect administrators to "purg[e] their schools of ac-
tionable peer harassment," and "should refrain from second-guessing
[administrators'] disciplinary decisions.""' 5
In contrast to the Title VII standard for employer liability, there are
two critical things to notice about the Title IX standard. First, it is the
harassed woman's burden to show that officials at the educational insti-
tution actually knew of her harassment and acted with deliberate
indifference to it, a behemoth task not just as a matter of trial produc-
tion, but also because of the subjectivity of the Supreme Court's test.
Second, as Justice Stevens noted in dissent in Gebser, it is now all about
plausible deniability: "So long as [institutions] can insulate themselves
from knowledge about this sort of conduct, they can claim immunity
from damages liability."
1 1 6
Why should employees receive more protection from sexual har-
assment than students? According to Justice O'Connor writing for the
majority in Gebser, the difference between Title VII and Title IX is that
the former is a legal command that covers most employers without their
having to buy-in, whereas the latter is a "contract" between taxpayers
and recipient educational institutions, whereby the latter would not en-
gage in sex discrimination in exchange for federal funding. The Court
declared that contract law required that the institution know that it was
in breach before it could be subject to penalties, hence, the actual
knowledge and deliberate indifference standards.' 7
In dissent in Gebser, Justice Stevens described an entirely different
vision. If the purpose of Title IX is to eliminate sex discrimination in
education, surely the standard should be at least as strict as the standard
imposed against employers. Employers, particularly insofar as anyone
believes in neo-liberal-law-and-economics ideas, operate in the free mar-
ket. They can do what they want so long as they do not discriminate
within narrow legalistic limits. On the other hand, we pay educational
institutions to end sex discrimination in education. Justice Stevens noted
that a Tide IX recipient undertakes a duty that "constitutes an affirmative
114. Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999).
115. Davis, 526 U.S. at 648.
116. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 300-01 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
117. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 286-89.
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undertaking that is more significant than a mere promise to obey the
law... That does not necessarily require a strict liability standard, but it
surely requires more than what the majority allowed-legally insulated
unknowing.
Gebser and Davis can be understood as federal permission to keep
male supremacy in the curriculum. A "see-no-evil, hear-no-evil" atti-
tude, which was already the point-of-view of the educational
institutions, became enshrined as an almost infallible legal strategy.'19
Add these factors: infallible legal strategy + "acquaintance rape can't be
proved" prosecutorial default position + "boys will be boys" hard-wiring
defense to rape + historical pandering to and overprotection of football
teams. The result is an hermetic seal on the open secrets of football.
Those secrets keep working because we never say them out loud. 20
2. Dizzy Doctrines Regarding Title IX Remedies
Title IX is terribly confused regarding the availability of injunctive
relief to an individual plaintiff. This is problematic, apparently, only in
sexual harassment / sexual assault Title IX cases."' In some of those
cases, federal courts have denied plaintiffs access to injunctive relief, but
have done so without clear reasoning. I surmise, however, that it stems
from spiraling confusion about the role of federal agency enforcement in
Title IX matters.
Recall that Title IX obligations are triggered by educational institu-
tions' acceptance of federal funds. The ultimate punishment for Title IX
violations is the termination of federal funding. Only the Department of
Education can cut off those funds, but it has never done so in the his-
tory of Title IX. An individual complainant can file a complaint with
the Office of Civil Rights of the Department of Education, but it is dif-
ficult to imagine why she would bother. Not only has the Education
Department never cut off funds, the OCR has never even referred any
Title IX case to the Department of Justice for enforcement. 12
118. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 297 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
119. Deborah L. Rhode, Sex in Schools: Who's Minding the Adults?, in MACKINNON &
SIEGEL, supra note 111, at 298.
120. First two rules of fight club: (1) don't talk about fight club; (2) don't talk about fight
club. PALAHNIUK, supra note 51, at 48-49.
121. Thus, in a situation involving a university's unlawful discontinuation of a women's
softball team, the Tenth Circuit referred simply to defendant's "continuing violation
of Title IX" for the proposition that monetary relief would be inadequate. Roberts v.
Colo. Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824, 833 (10th Cit. 1993).
122. 4 OFFICE OF CIVIL RIGHTS EvALUATION, U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, TEN-YEAR
CHECK-UP: HAVE FEDERAL AGENCIES RESPONDED TO CIVIL RIGHTS RECOMMENDA-
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It is unsurprising that the Office for Civil Rights has done so little.
In its investigation, the OCR has to find areas of noncompliance with the
laws before any further steps are taken, and the next step is mere
negotiation with the recipient for a voluntary resolution.1 23 Of course,
post-Gebser, the standards for non-compliance with Title IX-actual
knowledge of sexual harassment and deliberate indifference-are in-
credibly high, so it is difficult to imagine that the OCR would ever now
find non-compliance or exact anything more from recipients other than
a promise to do better.
Here's the dizzying part: in Gebser itself, the majority was thinking
about the cut-off of federal funds to justify its contract model in setting
such a high standard for institutional liability in cases brought by indi-
viduals. But no individual can accomplish the cut-off of federal funds. It
was up to Justice Stevens in dissent to point out the screwy order of
remedies. The individual plaintiff has an enormous burden because she
cannot accomplish what only the Office for Civil Rights can do and
which it has never done.
1 24
This confusion has resulted in an inability for individual plaintiffs
to get injunctive relief in Title IX cases. Thus, in a case brought by a
female student alleging sexual harassment by a professor, the Southern
District of Iowa relied largely on the confusion about the role of the Of-
fice of Civil Rights of the Department of Education. Since the OCR
regulations provide that there be an opportunity for "voluntary compli-
ance" in the administrative enforcement process, the court believed that
an opportunity for voluntary compliance should also be available when
an individual sought equitable remedies.
125
TIONS?, 29 (2004), http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/lOyrO4/1OyrO4.pdf. The Department
of Education practically admits that it is not going to do very much. The OCR report
to Congress states that "[d]uring FY 2005, OCR continued using an investigative ap-
proach that stresses full investigation of complaints." OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S.
DEP'T OF EDUC., ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: FISCAL YEAR 2005 (2005),
http://www.ed.gov/print/about/reports/annual/ocr/annrpt2005/report.html.
I don't know who writes these things, or why they don't have proofreaders, but
the truth shines through: OCR investigates but doesn't meaningfully enforce. Title
IX complainants understand that they are not going to get much administrative relief:
in 2005, only 6% of complaints filed with the OCR involved sex discrimination, and
that was true in 2004 as well. Id. For 2004, see OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S.
DEP'T OF EDUC., ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: FISCAL YEAR 2004 (2004), http://
www.ed.gov/print/about/reports/annual/ocr/annrpt2004/report.html.
123. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS:
FISCAL YEAR 2005 (2005), http://www.ed.gov/print/about/reports/annual/ocr/
annrpt2005/report.html.
124. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 303-04 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
125. Frederick v. Simpson Coll., 160 F. Supp. 2d 1033, 1035-37 (S.D. Iowa 2001).
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Confusing the matter further, the federal judge in Iowa stated that
additional support for denial of injunctive relief to the plaintiff could be
found in the federal doctrine of standing. Though the situation "may be
capable of repetition yet evading review" (which I thought to be a
mootness doctrine), the plaintiff had left the college but had not indi-
cated that she was returning. Therefore, there was no further potential
harm to her, and she could not show that the injunctive relief could
remedy any harm to her, therefore she had no standing to seek injunc-
tive relief.
126
The Eleventh Circuit has embraced this reasoning in a case that is
otherwise among the handful that have recently provided some hope to
female victims of athlete violence. In Williams v. Regents of the University
of Georgia,127 the plaintiff alleged that she had consensual sex with Geor-
gia basketball player Tony Cole (quoted at the beginning of section
II.A., infira) in his room. Unbeknownst to her, per prior arrangement,
Georgia football player Brandon Williams was hiding in Cole's closet.
After the consensual sex, Williams emerged and raped the plaintiff.
While that was happening, Cole was on the phone to another basketball
player and another football player, advising them to come over because
they were "running a train"-a slang expression for gang rape-on the
plaintiff.
128
The District Court granted summary judgment to the University of
Georgia on plaintiff's Title IX claim. The Eleventh Circuit reversed the
summary judgment, but affirmed the District Court's holding that in-
junctive relief should not be available to the plaintiff. According to the
Court of Appeals, the plaintiff lacked "standing to pursue injunctive
relief because the threat of future harm to [her] and other students is
merely conjectural."'29 Can that possibly be so if a plaintiff has already
proven the institution's "deliberate indifference" to a hostile and violent
educational environment?
The Title IX cases tending toward a "doctrine" that injunctive relief
should not be available to individual plaintiffs in sex abuse matters
seems particularly wrong-headed in light of both the substance and dif-
ficulty of showing Title IX liability in the first place. If, in order to get
any sort of relief, one has to prove that the institution had actual knowl-
edge of a risk and showed deliberate indifference to it, it seems that, as a
matter of course, a judgment should contain orders requiring the insti-
126. Frederick, 160 F. Supp. 2d at 1037.
127. Williams, 477 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2007).
128. Williams, 477 F.3d at 1288.
129. Williams, 477 F.3d at 1302-03 (emphasis added).
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tution not only to cease and desist, but to be advised of specific judi-
cially-enforceable risks to it should it fail to do better.
In summary, Title IX standards for both liability and remedial op-
tions encourage institutional irresponsibility. Those standards are why I
discourage clients from relying on Title IX alone, or, in most cases, at
all.
III. THE RELATION BETWEEN BIG-TIME
SPORTS AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE
As I have discussed at length in prior publications, conventional le-
gal notions of "causation" are a pit of pointlessness in many legal
situations, 1 0 and seem interminably vicious traps for claims on behalf of
women.' This legal situation is no exception. Discussions of harm to
women have always, in my experience, proceeded in a familiar spirit of
radical unaccountability. Thus, I surmise that the default position in
most conversations about sports violence is, even if sports don't diffuse
aggressiveness,1 2 surely athlete-rapists are just a few bad apples and the
incidents are "isolated."
No intelligent person could claim that male college athletes inevi-
tably become rapists. Such a silly notion, however, is not at all the point.
The questions are how some collegiate athletic programs, as presently
organized, encourage sexual violence, and how educational institutions
fail as educational institutions in allowing that to happen.
A. The Stilted Causal View
Some courts seem to believe that in order to satisfy the first part of
the test for institutional liability for sexual abuse under Title IX-that
there was a known risk of which the university was actually aware-a
plaintiff needs to come close to proving an absolute 18th century New-
tonian cause-and-effect relationship between sports and sexual assault.
130. ANN SCALES, LEGAL FEMINISM: ACTIVISM, LAWYERING, AND LEGAL THEORY 47-62
(2006) (discussing federal courts' wholesale invention of causal criteria in toxic tort
cases).
131. Ann Scales, "Nobody Broke It: It Just Broke: " Causation as an Instrument of Obfiscation
and Oppression, in DAVID ENGEL & MICHAEL MCCANN, EDS., FAULT LINES: TORT
LAW AND CULTURAL PRACTICE (2008) (discussing manipulation of causal analysis in
pharmaceutical litigation on behalf of women).
132. See discussion of the catharsis theory infia notes 274-287 and accompanying text.
2009]
MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF GENDER & LAW
1. Example: District Court in Simpson v. University of Colorado
As explained above, before settlement of the University of Colorado
football gang-rape case, the 10th Circuit had reversed summary judg-
ment in favor of the University. But the 10th Circuit did not give
explicit direction on the meaning of causation, and used the concept of
causation in an off-handed way.'33 Though the Colorado case will not go
to trial, other similar cases will surely be filed, and some of them may go
to trial. For that reason, it is instructive to scrutinize the District Court's
reasoning in the Simpson case.
At the trial court level in Simpson, Judge Blackburn agreed with the
plaintiff that the risk could be presented by a group of harassers (football
players and football recruits) rather than by individuals. "4 However, the
court talked about the connection between the sports program and sex-
ual assault in a fashion that was both causally naive and hugely insulting
to athletes. In the course of the opinion granting summary judgment to
the defendant, the court stated that the university must have had actual
notice that "most or all football players and most or all recruits involved
in the CU football recruiting program presented a risk of sexual assault
against female CU students who might come into contact with these
players and recruits."'' 5
That never has been and cannot be the test. Even the District
Court in the University of Colorado case didn't believe it, and that is
among the many indicia that the District Court's real holding was that
"no law can stand in the way of winning football games." The court re-
jects its own requirement that football teams and recruits be shown to
be universally dangerous. As the court put it, "It] he more a risk becomes
generalized, the more that risk is likely to fall outside of the narrowly
circumscribed scope of Title IX liability."'36 Hold on. Risk must always
be focused to some extent in order to be linguistically intelligible (as
opposed to, "something bad might happen, I don't know what"). The
reader discerns the problem here. The plaintiff needed to show both the
universality and the non-universality of the risk from the football pro-
gram at the University of Colorado.
There are many logical contradictions in the opinion, and it is also
paradigmatic of a problem that many commentators have observed for
133. Simpson v. Univ. of Colo. Boulder, 500 F.3d 1170, 1174-75 (10th Cir. 2007)
(plaintiffs alleged that the assaults "were the natural, perhaps inevitable, result of an
officially sanctioned but unsupervised effort to show recruits a 'good time.' ").
134. Simpson v. Univ. of Colo. Boulder, 372 F. Supp. 2d 1229 (D. Colo. 2005).
135. Simpson, 372 F. Supp. 2d at 1240 (emphasis added).
136. Simpson, 372 F. Supp. 2d at 1236.
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many years about sexual harassment litigation. It seems that in such liti-
gation, it doesn't really matter what any plaintiff shows. Every incident is
an isolated incident. In the summary judgment record in the CU case,
there were at least seven incidents of sexual assault involving football
players over four years. There had been extraordinary attempts on the
part of the football program to protect the players and intimidate
women into shutting up. Even with that information on the record, the
court parsed every piece of evidence in championship style, winnowing
the record down to what it thought were only three pieces of evidence
that could possibly be relevant to prove actual notice to the University.
The court concluded: "Even when considered together, however, these
three incidents do not combine into a constellation of relevant events to
provide sufficient notice of the particular risk to sustain Tide IX liabil-
ity.
" 137
Remember, the Tenth Circuit decision simply reversed summary
judgment in the Simpson matter. The case settled, so it will not be tried.
In some future case, however, decisions must be made about what evi-
dence to admit, and how to instruct the jury about how to consider that
evidence in order to meet a more coherent legal standard.
2. Thinking More Coherently
So what of the connection between college football and sexual as-
sault? One researcher found that male student-athletes were three times
more likely than female student-athletes to have engaged in any violent
conduct off the field. 38 Another found a statistically significant relation-
ship between athletic participation and sexual aggression on a large• 139
university campus. Yet another study found a higher percentage of
athletes using force to get women to engage in sex.'0 While one study
showed athletes disproportionately represented in reports of sexual as-
sault, abuse, and intimidation, another found that to be true only for
137. Simpson, 372 F. Supp. 2d at 1241.
138. See Howard L. Nixon II, Gender, Sport, and Aggressive Behavior Outside Sport, 21 J.
SPORT Soc. IssuEs 379, 384 (1997).
139. Mary P. Koss & John A. Gaines, The Prediction of Sexual Aggression by Alcohol Use,
Athletic Participation, and Fraternity Affiliation, 8 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 94
(1993).
140. Scot B. Boeringer, Influences of Fraternity Membership, Athletics, and Male Living
Arrangements on Sexual Aggression, 2 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 134, 141-43
(1996).
20091
MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF GENDER 6 LAW
athletes engaged in "contact" sports, namely football, hockey, and bas-
ketball."'
The social science debate about the connection between male stu-
dent-athletes and sexual violence has a long and complex history, and I
do not attempt to resolve that debate here. What I mean to emphasize is
that no study will ever resolve the issue if the issue is misunderstood as
whether male intercollegiate sports always present risks of harm to
women. Inevitably, a finding of a rape-supportive culture within a spe-
cific athletic program will depend upon other factors, such as coaching
influences, peer support for negative attitudes toward women, and insti-
tutional tolerance for athletic excess.' Moreover, a perfect research
project cannot be designed. It would be methodologically impossible-
not to mention unethical-simply to turn an infinite number of male
athletes (trained and privileged under the present system) loose and per-
petually to maintain surveillance of them to see whether and how many
women they rape and how much damage they do to those women's
lives.
Social science studies will always be indeterminate. In social science
research, samples will inevitably be small, parameters of study will inevi-
tably be open to challenge, and inferences will inevitably have to be
drawn. Each of the studies cited above came from different university or
college settings, and no one is saying that all athletic programs are
breeding grounds for rape. 143 For example, a recent study by Professors
Dave Smith and Sally Stewart concluded that collegiate athletes do not
have a greater propensity than non-athletes to commit sexual assault.
4
Their conclusion was nuanced; it was only that any direct connection
between sports and sexual violence is an oversimplification."4 No intelli-
gent person could disagree.
But consider the limitations of their study and the inferences lead-
ing to their conclusion. First, their study involved male undergraduates
at an English university, leading me-by no means a social scientist-to
141. Compare M.P. Fritner & L. Rubinson, Acquaintence Rape: The Influence of Alcohol,
Fraternity Membership, and Sports Team Membership, 19 J. OF SEX. ED. & THERAPY
272 (1993) with Todd W. Crosset et al., Male Student-Athletes Reportedfbr SexualAs-
sault: Survey of Campus Police Departments and Judicial Affairs, 19 J. SPORT & Soc.
ISSUES 126 (1995).
142. Todd Crosset, Male Athletes' Violence Against Women: A Critical Assessment of the
Athletic Affiliation, Violence Against Women Debate, 51 QUEST 244, 250-54 (1999).
143. See Peggy Reeves Sanday, Rape-Prone Versus Rape-Free Campus Cultures, 2 VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN 191 (1996).
144. Dave Smith & Sally Stewart, Sexual Aggression and Sports Participation, 26 J. SPORT
BEHAV. 384, 384 (2003).
145. Id. at 392.
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wonder how relevant their results were to U.S. college football, given the
"American exceptionalism" arguably applicable to that sport.146
Moreover, the inferences were highly suggestive. First, they agreed
with prior studies showing that men who hold "rape-supportive beliefs"
and who are hostile toward women are more likely to commit rape.147
Second, they agreed with prior studies that men who are more competi-
tive and "win-oriented" are likely to be more sexually aggressive toward
women. "The common dominator here may well be the need to domi-
nate ... ,,148 Their conclusion was simply that, because so many men
exhibit these negative attitudes, it is not rigorous to say that sports par-
ticipants are more likely to act on them. What the English researchers
did not attempt to study was how sports programs, particularly some
big-time U.S. collegiate sports, may contribute to (1) rape-supportive
beliefs, (2) hostility toward women, and (3) the need to dominate, and
not only on the part of participants in those sports, but on the part of
those who consume them.
The way lawyers are trained to look at "causation" is simplistic in a
number of ways. In these sexual assault situations, lawyers' instinct is to
rely on something called "mental intermediation." That is the issue, for
better or worse, in criminal prosecutions in satisfying various intent re-
quirements. When it comes to broader civil rights concerns, however,
does anyone actually question whether people ever act on their attitudes
and beliefs? Does individual "intent" matter, in most situations? In the
educational context, the question should be what responsibility institu-
tions have to develop attitudes and beliefs that reduce violence, or at
least to refrain from encouraging attitudes and beliefs that increase vio-
lence.
Lawyers and judges must not be captured by a never-ending social
science debate about the nature and scope of the risk in general. The
legal command is sex equality. If a particular sports program presents a
risk of harm, the legal problem is to measure the value of that athletic
program (as is) compared against the alternatives that protect women's
equality, whether that is conceived as educational opportunity, bodily
integrity, the right to be free from fear, or the right to have pride in our
own accomplishments. There may even be civilization beyond big-time
football as-it-is.
146. See text accompanying notes 45-48.
147. Smith & Steward, supra note 144, at 392.
148. Id. These authors' results showed that male athletes' attitudes in the "win-oriented"
(need to dominate) category were significantly higher than among non-athletes. Id.
at 390.
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B. A Serious Public Health Analysis of Sports and Violence
[T]he most dangerous men on earth are those who are afraid
that they are wimps.
-James Gilligan, M.D.'49
The increased risk of sexual violence presented by intercollegiate
sports is not a simple matter of cause and effect. It is a matter of a cul-
ture that forgives and even encourages certain sorts of violence,
particularly sexual violence against women committed by male sports
figures. It is a matter of history and culture and philosophy and psy-
chology and all the other enterprises that institutions of higher learning
are supposed to care about.
Many people with whom I have spoken about this Article just
shake their heads. They have come to the conclusion that our species is
inherently self-destructive. Often they think that the males among us are
inherently violent, and that if it weren't violent sports and warfare, ac-
tivities that societies allocate largely to males for whatever reasons,
society would invent other similar activities just as something to do in our
suicidal rush to annihilation. Bone-crushing and soul-crushing are the
activities our species has proven best adapted for. These people were all
reiterating what I call the "Loser Species" thesis. Ecocide, racial suprem-
acy, male supremacy, colonialism, radical capitalism, susceptibility to
divide-and-conquer fear-based strategies and all other forms of self-
hatred are also symptoms of the "Loser Species" thesis.
To capitulate to that, however, is itself a form of false conscious-
ness. If we can put one foot in front of another, we can think about this
further and what to do about it. Educators often speak of their mission
as providing students with the resources to thrive. That Aristotelian
goal, to teach to thrive, seems self-evidently to include providing re-
sources by which to conclude that ours in not necessarily a Loser
Species, by which the learner can have an incentive to carry on in con-
structive ways. It also seems self-evident that education, in addition to
providing those resources, should identify and minimize reinforcement
of the norms that lead to the Loses Species conclusion.
To that end, I've found an invaluable resource in Violence: Reflec-
tions on a National Epidemic by Dr. James Gilligan. His experience is
vast and dramatic. He directed the Center for the Study of Violence at
Harvard Medical School, was the former medical director of the
149. JAMES GILLIGAN, VIOLENCE: REFLECTIONS ON A NATIONAL EPIDEMIC 66 (1997).
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Bridgewater State Hospital (for the "criminally insane"), and was direc-
tor of mental health for the Massachusetts prison system. Dr. Gillian's
reports are both familiar and shocking. Among his numerous patients
are those who sought manhood by throwing off all rules, by destroying
all social context, by giving the finger to organized society, by killing and
raping and dismembering anyone who had any hope of living in the
same world with them, men whose victims were themselves and each
other, as well as women and children.
Dr. Gilligan presents what he calls a "public health" approach to
decreasing violence. In the first instance, Dr. Gilligan urges us not to fall
for the "Loser Species" thesis. Not only is it self defeating, but, he be-
lieves, it is something that we've been sold at a very high cost. In his
book, Dr. Gilligan systematically dismantles various theories of aggres-
sion. First, that it is inherently instinctual, 50 second, that it is genetic,"'
third, that it is about brain structure or brain damage, 52 and, fourth,
importantly, that it is about rampant testosterone."
3
For Gilligan, "all violence is an attempt to achieve justice, or what
the violent person perceives as justice." '154 Violence is not "insane" from
the point of view of the violent. There is always a logic behind it. But
the logic is dictated by "an intolerable condition of human shame and
rage."' To think sensibly about violence, Dr. Gilligan urges, we must
realize that "people feel incomparably more alarmed by a threat to the
psyche or the soul or the self than they are by a threat to the body."
1 56
Dr. Gilligan argues that the powers-that-be have no real interest in
reducing violence in society. So long as violence is pervasive, populations
will remain afraid, will remain divided and conquered, and will look to
oppressive and infantilizing leaders to keep us safe. In short, Gilligan
describes the hegemonic power of violence. He identifies eleven policies
that serve to maintain that hegemony:
1. Punishing more and more people (criminals) more and
more harshly....
2. Outlawing those drugs that inhibit violence.., while legal-
izing and advertising those that stimulate violence and cause
physical injury and death ....
150. Id. at 210-14 .
151. Id. at 214 -1 6 .
152. Id. at 217-18.
153. Id. at 221-23.
154. Id. at 11.
155. Id. at 55.
156. Id. at 96.
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3. Manipulating the tax laws and other economic policies so
as to increase the disparity income and wealth between
the rich and the poor ....
4. Depriving the poor of access to education ....
5. Perpetuating the caste divisions of society that usually fall
along racial lines ....
6. Exposing the public to entertainment that glorifies violence
and holds it out as a source of pride, honor, and masculine
self-esteem.
7. Making lethal weapons easily available to the general pub-
lic.
8. Maximizing the polarization and asymmetry of the social
roles of men and women. Nothing stimulates crime and vio-
lence more than the division of males and females into the
roles of violence object and sex object, respectively.
9. Encouraging the prejudice against homosexuality ....
10. Perpetuating and legitimizing the exposure of children
and youth to violence such as corporal discipline in school
and at home ....
11. Regulating the economy so as to ensure that unemploy-
ment will never be abolished .... "'
Obviously, all of these admonitions are interconnected. Nonethe-
less, I have put six in italics because they stand out as characteristics that
have special relevance to the culture of big-time college football. I will
combine these into four sub-categories, as means to analyze the ways
that college football contributes to violence, particularly sexual violence.
In using Dr. Gilligan's themes, I would emphasize three central as-
pects of his approach, as I understand it. He describes his list from the
point of view of those who wish to maintain power by cynical means,
ideological in origin and brutal in implementation. This violence-
maintaining structure would not be simple to dismantle. Moreover, he
does not say that violence would be eliminated by undoing one or more
of eleven policies on his list. Finally, no one has to agree that these
eleven policies are consciously or even unconsciously held by powerful
people and institutions. But I believe Dr. Gilligan would agree, and I
hope the reader agrees, that undoing any parts at any time could not
hurt in pursuit of a less violent society.
157. Id. at 187-89 (emphases added).
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1. Encouragement of Alcohol Abuse
Though there is not a one-to-one relationship between alcohol
over-consumption and violent behavior, many studies correlate the two.
Much alcohol-related violence is situational; destructive behavior follows
alcohol use where it is culturally expected to follow alcohol use.1"8
The relationship between college sports and alcohol is aptly encap-
sulated in the title of a book by Professor Murray Sperber called Beer
and Circus.5' Professor Sperber's primary thesis is that too many univer-
sities have invested in big-time sports and graduate education (or at least
in the salaries and research of superstars in the professoriate) while let-
ting undergraduate education languish. His title is adapted from the
ancient poet Juvenal, who used the term "bread and circus" to describe
how Roman emperors distracted the populace from governmental fail-
ures by providing cheap food and riveting gladiatorial contests. "0
Those ancient tail-gaiting parties are replicated every fall Saturday
afternoon in Boulder and similar sites of football frenzy. Alcohol was
deeply implicated in the CU football gang rapes in 2001, in a pattern
that is paradigmatic of how alcohol increases the risks of sexual as-
sault.16' In recent years (particularly since Congress had coaxed every
state to raise the drinking age to 21 as of 1987 2), universities have at-
tempted to crack down on campus drinking, but the party schools still
lose a student or two each year to alcohol poisoning, and the prohibi-
tions have resulted primarily in a "lively hide-and-seek game with the
authorities. ,161 University bookstores still sell shot-glasses and beer mugs
sporting the school logo; most universities still allow boozy tail-gaiters at
football games; some sell alcohol at athletic events, and still entertain
important alumni and boosters with alcohol in skyboxes at the games or
on patios at Presidents' houses.
158. Id. at 219. While there are complicating factors, alcohol is the one drug that is sys-
tematically shown to correlate with increased levels of violence. Illegal psychoactive
drugs that are also addictive are most likely to correlate with violence during periods
of users' withdrawal. For illegal psychoactive drugs in general, it is the illegal market
(and the "war" on that market) that produces violence, not the pharmacology. Id. at
220.
159. MURRAY SPERBER, BEER AND CIRCUS: How BIG-TIME COLLEGE SPORTS IS CIP-
PLING UNDERGRADUATE EDUCATION (2000).
160. Id. at xiv.
161. Sarah E. Ullman et al., Alcohol and Sexual Assault in a National Sample of College
Women, 14 J. OF INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 603 (1999).
162. Sperber, supra note 159, at 19.
163. Id.
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As Professor Sperber says:
Big-time [sports] U's, for all of their current pronouncements
about curtailing student drinking, will never allow their
schools and the surrounding areas to become dry. Officials of
these universities know that if their institutions become deserts
without alcoholic irrigation, this terrain would not sustain un-
dergraduate student life.' 64
Alcohol marketers figured out in the 1980s that young men who go
to college develop intense brand loyalty in those years, and that team
loyalty strongly reinforces brand loyalty. Some universities, perpetually
strapped for cash and even strapped for students when the baby boom-
ers got enough education, got a little cozy with the alcohol industry,
allowing advertising on campus, association of school mascots with
brands, etc. Though the "party school" appellation has become anath-
ema to admissions offices, some schools, at least for a while, came to
relish their emerging reputations as "good time" campuses.'65
That train is hard to stop. I for one would not want to prohibit col-
lege students from enjoying their beer on football weekends. Rather, the
idea is to get at the larger phenomena that connect football to sexual
violence-here, what Dr. Gilligan called the cultural expectations of
violence following alcohol consumption, and later, the expectations that
such violence will be sexual in nature.
2.Exploitation of Race and Poverty
Legal commentary focusing specifically on racism in college sports
is relatively recent. Professor Linda Greene wrote one of the earliest
pieces in 1984.166 Since then, a group of scholars has pressed the issue,
though they generally agree that it is under-theorized.167 "The Myth of
the Superspade: The Persistence of Racism in College Athletics," 168 by
Professor Timothy Davis, remains one of the most comprehensive
treatments of the myriad subtle ways that racism pervades college sports
164. Id. at 157.
165. Id. at 49-52.
166. Linda S. Greene, The New NCAA Rules of the Game: Academic Integrity or Racism?, 28
ST. Louis U. L.J. 101 (1984).
167. See Timothy Davis, Teaching Sports and the Law: The Relevance of Race, 1 VA. J.
SPORTS & L. 250 (1999) (providing a comprehensive bibliography as of that time).
168. Timothy Davis, The Myth of the Superspade: The Persistence of Racism in College Ath-
letics, 22 FoRDHAi URBa. L.J. 615 (1995).
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in the post-integration era. Professor Davis's title refers to the stereo-
types that have adhered to African-American athletes, those that assume
physical superiority while implying (and sometimes actually expressing)
intellectual inferiority.170 The resulting harms include:
subtle racism evidenced in different treatment during recruit-
ment; poor academic advice; harsh discipline; positional
segregation on the playing field and social segregation off it;
blame for ills for which they are not responsible. Then there
are the complaints of overt racism .... In short, the perpetua-
tion of stereotypes, incorporated into a dominant ideology,
continues to harm black student-athletes academically, athleti-
cally, economically, socially, and psychologically.
171
The scholars who study racism in college sports emphasize that, in
the athletic arms race, most coaches promise recruits (and their parents)
the world, but will abandon those promises should the recruits fail to
perform in their first season up to the coaches' expectations. The prom-
ises include inroads to professional athletic careers and even, in the first
instance, an education. Lots of those promises, however, turn out to be
empty.172 Those for whom such promises fail are disproportionately Afri-
can-American males.
73
Available data indicate that African-American athletes are dispro-
portionately involved in NCAA rules violations scandals and in off-field
"anti-social behavior[s] .'' 74 In the sexual assault incidents discussed in
this Article, African-American male athletes were disproportionately
involved.'75 In light of the other major premises of this
Article-particularly given institutional efforts to cover up at least some
sexual assaults-it is extremely difficult to know whether athletes of
169. Professor Davis also describes the formal and informal methods used to segregate
college teams on the basis of race prior to World War II. Id. at 624-34.
170. Id. at 644-51.
171. Id. at 659. See generally RICHARD E. LAPCHICK, FIVE MINUTES TO MIDNIGHT: RACE
AND SPORT IN THE 1990s (1991).
172. Richard Salgado, A Fiduciary Duty to Teach Those Who Don't Want to Learn: The
Potentially Dangerous Oxymoron of "College Sports," 17 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT.
L. 135, 158-62 (2007).
173. Id. at 144-48, 154-56.
174. Davis, supra note 168, at 667; Timothy Davis, An Absence of Good Faith: Defining A
University's Educational Obligation to Student-Athletes, 28 Hous. L. REV. 743, 759
(1991).
175. All of the alleged assailants in the Simpson case were African-American (as was one of
the alleged victims). E-mail from Kimberly M. Hult, Counsel for plaintiffs (Mar. 17,
2008).
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color have in general been more likely to participate in assaults,'76 or are
just more likely to be busted for such behaviors, or more likely to have
allegations against them publicized, or all of the above.
This is a complex set of issues. In studying the history of sports in
the United States, I see the ways that athletics have been both gates of
opportunity for people of color (though far less often than imagined by
some white people) and entrenched sites for the perpetual, and increas-
ingly complex, reproduction of racist notions. Professor Todd Crosset,
who was among the social science pioneers in demonstrating the hyper-
masculinity of sports in this country, has written a devastating piece
about the racism inherent in the Simpson case. Relying on documents in
evidence in that case, Crosset shows how the University of Colorado, in
an "attempt to stabilize the institution, . . . promoted a particular racial
framing of the incident."'77 Professor Crosset demonstrates how the uni-
versity, in a desperate defensive position, at once posited the football
stadium as "white space,"' 78 while at the same time it conjured the image
of the falsely accused black men in order to deflect attention from insti-
tutional responsibility.'79
The "Atticus Finch" trope"80 deployed by the University of Colo-
rado, however, is not a simple one. Race and sex and sexual orientation
(in addition to other presumed immutable characteristics) are differen-
tially deployed by those who hope to gain rhetorical advantage.
It is an old and painful dispute among those with multiple
group-based identities, and many of us are guilty of making unfair com-
parisons among social situations. One legal commentator, for example,
has argued that the November 2004 brawl among fans and professional
176. I hope it goes without saying that I do not believe that men of color are more likely,
anytime or anywhere, to commit sexual assaults. I do see, however, why behaviors of
athletes of color may stand out in the context of majority-white educational institu-
tions. Big-time athletes are put on a pedestal, but are often isolated from university
life. Many studies suggest that such athletes feel both isolated and beyond the rules
that apply to others. When some of those athletes are recruited as athletic performers,
particularly when recruited from socio-economic circumstances that are not im-
mersed in the assimilative norms of mostly white universities, it is not surprising that
their behaviors do not conform to some university expectations and/or get intense at-
tention when they do not. I do not think that has anything to do with race, whatever
that might mean, but with social facts of racism.
177. Todd Crosser, Capturing Racism: An Analysis of Racial Projects Within the Lisa Simp-
son v. University of Colorado Football Rape Case, 24 INT'L J. HIST. OF SPORT 172, 173
(2007).
178. Id. at 180. "From their perch high above Folsom Field, white donor/fans can simul-
taneously admire black men and hold them in judgement [sic], confirming for
themselves both their superiority and their colour-blindness." Id. at 184.
179. Id. at 188-189.
180. That is the position of the "benevolent, intellectual, principled white." Id. at 185.
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basketball players at a Detroit Pistons game181 had been cast by the me-
dia in the most racist possible light. In his introduction, the author
asked readers to understand that the African-American players were seen
against an imagined background of criminal activities, which he de-
scribed as follows:
Imagine a laundry list of felonies, misdemeanors and personal
indiscretions. Begin with some obviously significant offenses like
murder or large-scale drug distribution, then pepper the list
with collateral offenses like individual drug use, obstruction of
justice or perjury. Throw in theft, assault, and the possession
of unlicensed firearms. Include some relatively minor offenses
like excessive traffic tickets and adultery, but be sure to remem-
ber spousal abuse, statutory rape and rape. Add being five minutes
late for work.1
2
While it is hard to disagree that much media coverage of the brawl
in Detroit was racist, and though the author does not focus on sex
crimes in the rest of the article, this was a jarring cascade of offenses in
what the author seemed to regard in decreasing order of seriousness.
Actual allegations of sexual misconduct against African-American
male athletes have demonstrated the "under-theorization" of the prob-
lem. I happened to be in Chicago on the day that boxer Mike Tyson was
sentenced to six years in prison for rape. 83 I was astonished on that day
that Chicagoans of all conceivable sorts felt the need to talk to me about
it. Each of them wanted me-a perfect stranger-to assure them that
the verdict was wrong, that Mike was the victim, and that regardless of
the jury verdict in Indiana, he just couldn't have done it.184 I ended up
hiding in my hotel room.
181. Associated Press, Pistons' and Pacers' Brawl Spills Into Crowd, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20,
2004, at DI.
182. Jeffrey A. Williams, Flagrant Fouk Racism in "The Ron Artest Fight," 13 UCLA ENT.
L. REV. 55 (2005) (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
183. E.R. Shipp, Tyson Found Guilty on 3 Counts As Indianapolis Rape Trial Ends, N.Y
TIMES, Feb. 11, 1992, at Al. I do not know why the reaction in Chicago was so
strong, as Mr. Tyson's home town is Brooklyn, N.Y. Perhaps it was because the rape
and conviction had occurred in neighboring Indiana, and of course, Chicago is nuts
for sports. Mr. Tyson served half of the sentence. Ira Berkow, After Three Years in
Prison, Tyson Gains His Freedom, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 1995 .
184. I was also living in Colorado for the entirety of the Kobe Bryant incident. Rape charges
against Mr. Bryant were dropped after the presiding judge made a ruling, controversial
under the Colorado Rape Shield statute, that certain evidence of the alleged victim's
sexual history would be admissible. Tom Kenworthy & Patrick O'Driscoll, Judge
Dismisses Bryant Rape Case, USA TODAY, Sept. 1, 2004. I witnessed a frenzy of public
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Professor Kevin Brown published a provocative essay about the
Tyson situation, 18  reporting conversations with other African-
American males in Indiana about it. His non-scientific findings identi-
fied what he called "two dominant beliefs in African-American
culture." First is that African-Americans, and particularly African-
American males, cannot get fair treatment in the U.S. criminal justice
system. Second is that the fight against racism needs to trump the fight
against sexism, even when practiced against African-American
186
women.
In his second announced "dominant belief," Professor Brown has
dived into the roughest possible seas, politically speaking. He evokes
what I have elsewhere described and denounced as the "oppression
sweepstakes," a divide-and-conquer strategy that keeps much from be-
ing accomplished.187 I don't purport to be an expert on African-
American culture, but I am an expert on divide-and-conquer prob-
lems, on several different levels. The divide-and-conquer problem
cannot be resolved by data or debate. I take the exploitation of male
(and female188) athletes of color to be a fact, as I take the epidemic of
athlete violence against women to be a fact. Again, the discussion must
be understood, I contend, within Dr. Gilligan's analysis of the factors
that fuel violence. Dismantling of racial caste systems in sports (and in
higher education overall) is one necessary ingredient in any serious
formula for reducing sports violence.
support for Mr. Bryant, particularly on talk-radio outlets. He just couldn't have done
it, conclusively proven by the fact that the alleged victim went voluntarily to his hotel
room. Contrary to fondly-held belief, the controversy didn't hurt Mr. Bryant's career.
Indeed, the opposite may be true. See NBA.com, Lakers' Bryant Ends Season Atop
NBA's Most Popular Jersey List, June 11, 2007, http://www.nba.com/news/
popularjerseys_070 6 11 .html.
185. Kevin Brown, The Social Construction of a Rape Victim: Stories of African-American
Males About the Rape of Desiree Washington, 1992 U. ILL. L. REv. 997.
186. Id. at 1000-02. The rape victim in the Mike Tyson case was an African-American
woman.
187. Ann Scales, Avoiding Constitutional Depression: Bad Attitudes and the Fate of Butler, 7
CAN. J. WOMEN & L. 349 (1994), reprinted in FEMINISM AND PORNOGRAPHY (DRU-
CILLA CORNELL & THERESA BRENNAN, EDS., 2000).
188. See, e.g., Alfred Dennis Mathewson, Black Women, Gender Equity, and the Function at
the Junction, 6 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 239 (1996).
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3. Enforcement of Prejudice against Homosexuality
A professional football player's working environment is not
severely or pervasively abusive ... if the coach smacks him
on the buttocks as he heads onto the field.
-Antonin Scalia'8
In the United States, sports have long been a way to make homo-
erotic feelings acceptable, for men and women alike. One source reports
that until Yale went coed in the 1970s, swimmers at the university pool
were required to swim nude.19° The reader can imagine for herself the
point of that, as well as the point of Justice Scalia's completely gratuitous
admonition that fanny-patting by coaches cannot constitute sexual har-
assment in NFL employment.
Mariah Burton Nelson suggests that boys fall in love with spectator
sports "as an integral part of falling in love with the masculine privilege
that their fathers symbolize."'19' In my experience, little boys don't have
to have fathers to have powerful incentives to embrace masculine privi-
lege, and violent sports are the most ubiquitous conduit. Nelson is quite
right, though, that in the rest of life, women are hard to factor out of
boys' lives. It is in those violent sports, particularly hockey and Ameri-
can football, that "male spectators can participate in an illusion of male
superiority. They can root for men, for male power and might." 2
In football, both men and women get to worship male bodies.
Women have plenty of opportunities and incentives to do that in other
contexts, but men do not. There are at least two things going on. One is
that traditional masculinity in the U.S. defines men as strong and un-
feeling. Sports provide an opportunity for men to have very strong
feelings about men. In addition, "[s]ome of what men seem to feel is
turned on .... The occasional appearance of women [as cheerleaders]
legitimizes the turn-on of sports, distracting fans from the uncomfortable
189. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serv. Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998). Justice Scalia was
writing for a unanimous Supreme Court holding that same-sex sexual harassment, in
a case involving an all-male work crew on an offshore oil rig, could be actionable un-
der Title VII. Justice Scalia just felt he had to add that the highest court in the land
could not have meant to include professional football within the analysis!
190. GoRN & GORDSTEIN, supra note 43, at 163.
191. MARiAH BURTON NELSON, THE STRONGER WOMEN GET, THE MORE MEN LovE
FOOTBALL: SEXISM AND THE AMERICAN CULTURE OF SPORTS 106 (1994).
192. Id. at 107.
2009]
MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF GENDER & LAW
fact of male athletes' erotic appeal .... Men who love football love
,,193
men.
It would be a beautiful thing for men to love other men, including
erotically, whether in person or from afar as in the football context, if
some men didn't kill other men for being public about it. Or if some
Supreme Court Justices didn't consistently vote against the well-being of
gay people while gratuitously enshrining football fanny-patting as im-
mune from the rule of law. It is a twisted situation when the love of
one's own gender cannot be expressed unless expressed in the context of
violence.
As Professor Sanday detailed in her groundbreaking study of
gang-rape, the male bond as presently constituted in some campus
institutions appears fundamentally to require the perpetual and aggres-
sive expression of homophobia. 94 Timothy Jon Curry, in his study of
locker-room behavior among men on campuses, points out that one's
place on the team is never completely secure; there is constant competi-
tion among teammates to prove who is most worthy. Worthiness
includes constant maintenance of the gender bond, and that requires
"doing gender through homophobic talk," performances that allow
teammates "to reaffirm to themselves and others that their sexual prefer-
ences remained within the boundaries of the bond.,
195
At the end of the day, it is not meaningful to separate the vilifica-
tion of homosexuality from the next set of concerns regarding the
treatment of women. These are part of the dialectics of gender. As Pro-
fessor Curry puts it, "'real men' are defined by what they are not
(women and homosexuals).' 96
193. Id. at 115-18. Half of the cheerleaders on collegiate squads are now male. They tend
to be big and strong and extraordinarily athletic. I am not calling them gay, God for-
bid, but having them there, I think, adds to the gender homage, in that football-like
the other most violent sports in American history-are thoroughly homoerotic. See,
e.g., GoRN & GOLDSTEIN, supra note 43, at 73-74. See also infra text accompanying
notes 212-14. I suppose NFL teams, as a matter of sheer economics, cannot afford to
have male cheerleaders. That product cannot endure a whiff of the queer.
194. See generally PEGGY REEVES SANDAY, FRATERNITY GANG RAPE: SEX, BROTHERHOOD,
AND PRMLEGE ON CAMPUS (1990).
195. Timothy Jon Curry, Fraternal Bonding in the Locker Room: A Profeminist Analysis of
Talk About Competition and Women, 8 Soc. oF SPORT J. 119, 129-30 (1991).
196. Id. at 129 (emphasis in original).
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4. Glorification of Violence as a Source of Masculine Self-Esteem
and Maximization of the Asymmetry of Gender
As noted above, Dr. Gilligan believes that structures of masculine
self-esteem and separation from femininity are the major sources of vio-
lence in society. While he weaves race, class, education, and substance-
abuse into his discussion, he keeps coming back to the theme of gender
(including homophobia). In this, Dr. Gilligan is not an essentialist, but
an empiricist."' He's done the field work. He reports that it is men who
are most often violent, and it is their gender anxiety that makes them
violent. In discussing football, it is impossible to separate out the glorifi-
cation of violence as a source of masculine self-esteem and the
maximization of gender difference (just as it is impossible to separate
out fear of homosexuality), because they come together so seamlessly in
that sport.
Indeed, colleges that field football teams are funding a weekly gen-
der festival during the season. During this expensive and gaudy ritual,
both male actors (primarily as players, but also as the most visible fans-
when they strip and paint their bodies) and female actors (primarily as
sexy cheerleaders) wear elaborate costumes and perform elaborate dances
that reenact hugely exaggerated gender roles. The men enact a fake
war. '9 The women enact a near-hysterical celebration of the war. The
cardinal rule is that the women do not participate in the war.
People enjoy the rituals of football as escapes from the daily grind,
but the ritualized aspects bear examination. Gilligan states that the two
basic characteristics of ritual are repetition and theatrical exaggeration.'99
Consider just one aspect of the theater-the costumes-by comparison
to a delightful excerpt from Virginia Woolf. Without describing the un-
derlying case, Woolf quotes the remarks of someone named "Mr. Justice
MacCardie" regarding the case of someone named "Mrs. Frankau":
"Women cannot be expected to renounce an essential feature of femi-
ninity or to abandon one of nature's solaces for a constant and
insuperable physical handicap .... In matters of dress women often
remain children to the end.
20
1
197. The distinction is itself contested. In this case, I'm willing to give the empiricist privi-
lege to Dr. Gilligan, given his vast experience on what has actually motivated violent
men.
198. Fiction writer Don DeLillo has derided the comparison of football and warfare as a
clich6. DON DELILLO, END ZONE 164 (Penquin Books 1986) (1972). However, just
because it is a clich6 does not mean that it is not true. Recall that when the War in
Iraq (2003-present) was first compared to Vietnam, that, too, was derided as a clichd.
199. GILLIGAN, supra note 149, at 78.
200. WOOLF, supra note 9, at 150 n.16.
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Woolf's commentary is priceless:
The Judge who thus dictated was wearing a scarlet robe, an
ermine cape, and a vast wig-of artificial curls. [This situation]
raises two questions: how often must an act be performed be-
fore it becomes traditional, and therefore venerable; and what
degree of social prestige causes blindness to the remarkable na-
ture of one's own clothes? Singularity of dress, when not
associated with high office, seldom escapes ridicule.20'
Leaving aside those male fans who strip to the waist and paint their
bodies, the uniforms of football players surely have numerous functional
features-but, please. "Functional" is a contested concept (every aspect
of judges' dress was thought functional in Woolf's time), and it must be
admitted that much of the function of football dress is ritualistic-for
the purposes of theater and intimidation. Those are some shiny tight
pants.
And what of the female cheerleader outfits? 212 These extraordinary
athletes (who face a statistical risk of serious physical injury as great as
football players themselves) work without the protective functional fea-
tures of prescribed football player attire. On another level, of course,
their dress is very "functional" to advertise their job as sex objects.
Dr. Gilligan's second criterion for ritualistic behavior is repetition.
Every September, I am astonished by how the culture of the United
States is re-invigorated (re-masculinized?) at the beginning of the foot-
ball season. The season start is something almost magical on many
college campuses. I do not begrudge fans their enjoyment of football,
but I am sometimes afraid of the intensity of the magic. Dr. Gilligan
reported that when men feel threatened as men, they often find it neces-
sary to intensify their masculinity "through the introduction of
magic., 203 It is this aspect of football to which I referred earlier when I
spoke of the apparent necessity to speak of winning college football
201. Id.
202. Cheerleading was originally a male student activity, but not an athletic one. They
roamed the sidelines at football games attempting to organize fans. World War II re-
quired that females take over the job. The hypersexualization of the female
cheerleader coincided, not surprisingly, with the advent of Tide IX. Bryan Curtis,
Cheerleaders: What To Do About Them, SLATE, Apr. 1, 2005, http://
www.slate.com/id/2116060. Today, approximately half of high-school and college
cheerleaders are male, but those men do not wear skimpy clothes or provide the
"honey shots" on television. See NATALIE GUICE ADAMs & PAMELA J. BEaTS, CHEER-
LEADER!: AN AMERICAN ICON (2002).
203. GILLIGAN, supra note 149, at 85.
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coaches as "legendary." In a sport otherwise obsessed with statistics and
documentation, it has always seemed odd to label these men with a
word referring, typically, to that which is not verifiable. I think this is
just one example of how the hegemony of football works: it is infused
with the power of myth, even with the power of the sacred.
Virginia Woolf also suggested that Mister Justice McCardie's lack of
fear of ridicule in wearing his silly outfit must owe largely to "the hyp-
notic power of dominance., 201 She directs us back to the importance of
shame and ridicule as sources of violence. Dr. Gilligan tells us that "re-
spect" for something-even if it is respect arising out of an unreal
loyalty-is what men desperately crave. His patients' narratives were
loaded with the language of "disrespect. ''20 In Gilligan's experience, dis-
respect is irrefutably associated with being dominated, which is
irrefutably associated with being shameful about something.
In Dr. Gilligan's view, there are three pre-conditions to violence
perpetrated by men. First, "the most carefully guarded secret held by
violent men" is that they feel ashamed "over matters that are so trivial
that their very triviality makes it even more shameful to feel ashamed
about them. 2°6 We know what these are: everything from slow growth
to high academic performance to acne to small penis size to (merely)
having emotions to every other of a million unfair and destructive
things that society has placed on the list of unmanly attributes. Second,
when men don't have or can't get the resources to dissipate their shame,
violence is provided to them as an outlet. °7 Third, violent people, usu-
ally men, do not develop the emotional resources, stimulated by shame,
that inhibit the violent impulses.
Recall here that the event at issue in the University of Colorado
case was an alleged gang rape. Some studies show that, while male ath-
letes are a small proportion of college students, up to a third of the
perpetrators of gang rapes on or around campuses are male athletes.2 9
The campus gang rape phenomenon has been understood as a set of
discourses, rituals, ideologies, and practices that make some male
204. WOOLF, supra note 9, at 150 n.16.
205. GILLIGAN, supra note 149, at 105.
206. Id. at 111-12.
207. Id. at 112.
208. Id. at 114. Moreover, ritualized degradation ceremonies intensify the effects of
shame, id. at 152, particularly the sorts of degradation ceremonies associated with
military induction, prison admission, fraternity hazing, and athletic team practices.
209. Chris S. O'Sullivan, Acquaintance Gang Rape on Campus, in ACQUAINTANCE RAPE: THE
HIDDEN CRIME 140, 144 (Andrea Parrot & Laurie Bechhofer eds., 1991); See also J.tK
ERHART & BERNICE SANDLER, CAMPUS GANG RAPE: PARTY GAMES, ASSOCIATION OF
AMERICAN COLLEGES, PROJECT ON THE STATUS AND EDUCATION OF WOMEN (1985).
2009]
MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF GENDER & LAW
environments-usually high-status groups who are convinced or need
perpetually to be convinced of their own invulnerability-rape-prone.210
As noted in Section IV.A infra, the social science data do not purport to
implicate all exclusively male environments, and much depends in a
given environment on other factors-in football programs, particularly
upon the attitudes and practices of coaches. The engine of the gang
rape, however, appears to be peer support. Professor Sanday argues that
"rape prone attitudes and behavior on American campuses are adopted
by insecure young men who bond through homophobia and 'getting
sex.' The homoeroticism of their bonding leads them to display their
masculinity through heterosexist displays of sexual performance.
21
In gang-rape, friends' approval of the means of positioning the
212woman for sex (usually by getting her drunk) is important, and leader-
ship is important. 213 But the key seems always to be the men doing it for
each other, to prove their masculinity for each other. Watching is im-
perative.
Again, Tim Curry's study of locker room behavior-conducted at
two big-time Midwestern sports universities-corresponds with that
model. Curry's research added to this public debate about athlete vio-
lence important considerations of how young male athlete's insecurities
are compounded by uncertainty about their place on the team and
status within the team hierarchy. Intercollegiate participation is a cruci-
ble of anxiety.' So much time is devoted to the team that athletes can
have few extra-athletic involvements. 215 The bond with the team requires
constant maintenance and depends fundamentally on "doing gender" in
accepted ways.216
As discussed previously, one aspect of approved gender performance
is aggressive homophobia. The other set of approved gender perform-
ances includes the sexual objectification of women (including the
reduction of women to their body parts), braggadocio about sexual con-
quests, and competition among athletes to see who can express the most
negative attitudes toward women.1 7 In Curry's observations of football
210. See Sanday, supra note 194.
211. Sanday, supra note 143, at 194.
212. Seeid. at 195, 198.
213. See generally Louise E. Porter & Laurence J. Alison, A Partially Ordered Scale of Influ-
ence in Violent Group Behavior: An Example fom Gang Rape, 32 SMALL GROUP REs.
475 (2001) (examining the role of leadership in gang rape).
214. Curry, supra note 195, at 119, 127, 132.
215. Id. at 125.
216. Id. at 120.
217. Id. at 128-29.
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locker rooms, these "are stage performances usually requiring an audi-
ence of more than one, and may be told to no one in particular.)
218
Generally, athletic glory is short-lived. The higher men climb on
the athletic success ladder, the more emotionally injured they will be
when it topples. In many cases, and with generally worse consequences
for athletes of color and socio-economically disadvantaged athletes, the
sudden deprivation of athletics as a source of self-esteem will wreak
havoc in men's lives. For many, that change will not improve their opin-
ions of women or lessen their grasping toward masculinity.219 They were
somebody, and now they are nobody. Another source of shame.
Earlier in this Article I suggested that Roman gladiators were the
forefathers of U.S. collegiate football players. 220 The comparison is par-
ticularly apt because, in general, the gladiators were slaves, there to be
used up by their owners in service to the Empire. In football, few high
school athletes will play in college. Few collegians will play profession-
ally. Few professionals will make enough money to sustain themselves
and their families for life. Society will have used them up, while certain
other interests will have made fortunes from them.
The economy of gender discloses a huge gap between assets and
debits. In abandoning male athletes-at least in some programs-to
training in hypermasculinity, universities allow those young men to be
used up. In the wake of the male athletes' commodification and expen-
diture, the same universities reinforce the centuries' old views of women
that have allowed women to be turned into things, as well, but usually
with more grievous consequences.
IV. WHAT MIGHT HELP: A STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE
Some more powerful remedy is needed for victims of male-athlete
violence. Some powerful stimulus is needed that will expose the sup-
posed inevitability of college football-as-it-is, and that will consider the
ways that intercollegiate sports teach women-loathing. It would not be a
matter of male-bashing or abolishing the game that so many love. It
would rather be an opportunity for bringing football back into balance
with the educational mission at a state university-a mission, I contend,
that should include teaching sex equality.
218. Id. at 128.
219. Messner, supra note 195, at 108-48.
220. See supra text accompanying notes 160-62.
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In the CU football gang-rape case, there could have been any num-
ber of civil causes of action.' In my opinion, the most powerful civil
litigation remedy may have been (or may be, in some future case) the
Colorado State Equal Rights Amendment.2
Importantly, I do not wish to confine the analysis in this Article to
what could have transpired or might transpire in Colorado. I am among
the many lawyers who have internalized Justice Brennan's admonition
that state constitutional provisions have been undervalued and under-
used." 3 Given the right clients and the right lawyers, I truly believe that
any state constitution could provide more relief to sexual assault victims
of athletes at state universities224 than federal law presently does. Some
states are more generous than others in embracing their fundamental
federalist opportunities to interpret their state constitutions to provide
broader rights than those provided by the federal constitution. There
surely is a trend toward independence among state courts in light of the
tightening of individual rights in the federal courts. And I would be
proud to be among the lawyers to institute such a trend in any state that
has not yet done so.
It surely makes things easier, in the hypothetical case I will propose,
if a state constitution has an Equal Rights Amendment, or some other
explicit prohibition of sex discrimination. Things would be easier still if
such a prohibition has already been interpreted to be stronger than the
prohibition on sex discrimination as interpreted under the federal equal
protection clause. Presently, twenty-two states have explicit prohibitions
on sex discrimination in their state constitutions, or in other interpreta-
tions of their state constitutions.225
221. See, e.g., Robin Miller, Cause ofAction Under State Law Against Public School for Sex-
ual Harassment of Student by School Personnel or Other Student, 13 CAUSES OF ACTION
2D 1 (2006); Fried, supra note 81, at 77-9 1.
222. COLO. CONST. art. II., § 29 ("Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or
abridged by the state of Colorado or any of its political subdivisions on account of
sex."). An extraordinarily useful survey of state ERAs and similar provisions is Linda
J. Wharton, State Equal Rights Amendments Revisited: Evaluating Their Effectiveness in
Advancing Protection Against Sex Discrimination, 36 RUTGERS L.J. 1201 (2005).
223. See William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights,
90 HAtv. L. Rav. 489 (1977).
224. Actually, the litigation I propose would not be confined to state universities, as sev-
eral state Equal Rights Amendments do not have explicit "state action" requirements
or have limited "state action" requirements. LA. CONST. art. I, § 3; MONT. CONST.
art. II, §§ 4, 28; R.I. CONST. art. I, § 2; PA. CONST. art. I; see also Imboden v.
Chowns Communications, 182 F. Supp. 2d 433 (E.D. Pa. 2002). A number of other
state ERA's have "open-textured" and uninterpreted language on the state action is-
sue. Wharton, supra note 222, at 1229-37.
225. As Professor Wharton notes, supra note 222, sixteen states have what we might call
"traditional" Equal Rights Amendments. See ALASKA CONST. art I, § 3; COLO.
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I do not accept the criticism that a state-by-state approach is insuf-
ficient to change societal norms. If any state Supreme Court were to
affirm the issuance of the sort of injunction I propose, every football
program in the nation would instantly pay attention. This is a very dif-
ferent situation from same-sex marriage, for example. The state-by-state
approach there has evolved from historical circumstance, and depends to
an unintended degree (I believe) on how sister states will treat marriages
from Massachusetts and California.
I truly believe that any state can get there regarding athletic norms.
Nonetheless, I will proceed to analyze the hypothetical case under the
Colorado State Equal Rights Amendment226 for three reasons. First, the
Colorado ERA is relatively un-interpreted, as is the case with most state
ERAs and/or equal protection clauses (as applied to sex discrimination).
CONST. art. II, § 29; CONN. CONST. art. I, § 20; HAw. CONST. art. I, § 21; ILL.
CONST. art. I, § 18; MD. CONST. art. I, § 3; MAss. CONST. pt. I, art. 1; MONT.
CONST. art. II, § 4; N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 2; N.M. CONST. art. II, § 1; PA. CONST.
art. I, § 28 ; Tax. CONST. art. I, § 3a; VA. CONST. art. I, § 11; UTAH CONST., art. IV,
§ 1; WASH. CONST. art. XXXI, § 1; Wyo. CONST. art. I, § 2. An additional four
states, Florida, Iowa, Rhode Island, and Louisiana, have constitutional prohibitions
on sex discrimination that are limited in various ways. § 7; See FLA. CONST. art. I,
§ 2; IOWA CONST. art. I, %§ 1, 6; LA. CONST. art. I, § 3; R.I. CONST. art. I, § 2. In
addition, since 1879, California has had a provision in its constitution that prohibits
sex discrimination in employment. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 8. Perhaps more impor-
tantly in California, sex has been a "suspect classification" for equal protection
purposes under the state constitution since 1971. Sail'er Inn v. Kirby, 95 Cal. Rptr.
329, 339-41 (1971). In addition, the New Jersey Constitution guarantees natural
and inalienable rights to all "persons," defines "person" as meaning both sexes, and
the New Jersey Supreme Court has interpreted this provision to be a prohibition on
sex discrimination. N.J. CONST. art. I, para. 1, art. X, para. 4.
226. I recognize that constitutional litigation in Colorado is a risky business, as that state
constitution is one of the most easily and most often amended. See COLO. CONST.
art. 5, § 1, ' 2-3 (providing that initiatives and referenda may be placed upon bal-
lots by petitions signed by 5% of the number of voters cast for Secretary of State in
the last election). For comparisons among Colorado and other states, see K.K. Du-
Vivier, Out of the Bottle: The Genie of Direct Democracy, 70 ALB. L. REV. 1045
(2007); K.K. DuVivier, State Ballot Initiatives in the Federal Preemption Equation: A
Medical Marijuana Case Study, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 221 (2005). Amendment 2,
the anti-gay amendment invalidated by the United States Supreme Court is the most
infamous example of Colorado's constitutional fickleness. See Romer v. Evans, 517
U.S. 620 (1996). The litigation that I model in this Article would be fundamentally
different from Romer, in that it would include no federal constitutional cause of ac-
tion. The federal equal protection claim was necessary in Romer because the people of
Colorado had amended the state constitution, so no state constitutional cause of ac-
tion could trump that vote. If the Colorado Supreme Court ruled in favor of a
plaintiff in the case I hypothesize, there could be a statewide campaign to amend the
state constitution to exempt state university football from coverage of the state Equal
Rights Amendment. That would be interesting. If such a state constitutional
amendment passed, then the doctrines of Romer v. Evans would come into play.
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Any state court could adopt the analysis I propose. Second, my primary
example is Simpson v. University of Colorado.27 1 was around for the up-
roar; I counseled students through their hurt and outrage; I worked with
plaintiff Lisa Simpson's lawyers on their appellate argument. Third,
there is real potential in states like Colorado. Among other things, as is
also true in many state constitutions, there are several pockets of
"unique" language-language not appearing in the federal constitu-
tion-in the Colorado state constitution. In addition to the state ERA,
the Colorado State Constitution contains an "Inalienable Rights" clause,
that guarantees among other things the right of "seeking and obtaining
... safety and happiness.""22 It also includes a guarantee of a "thorough
and uniform system of free public schools" for residents "between the
ages of six and twenty-one years.,,221
Focusing on our hypothetical case, if the facts were the same as
those in Simpson v. University of Colorado, the first difference is that we,
as hypothetical plaintiffs' attorneys, would reject the federal Title IX
cause of action in favor of a claim based on the Colorado state Equal
Rights Amendment. In her complaint and in discovery, the plaintiff
would have identified specific practices and policies of the football pro-
gram, the athletic department, and the university that caused or allowed
her sexual assault to occur. The plaintiff would be seeking damages, but
she would also be seeking an injunction that would respond specifically
to improving those practices and policies, in order to prevent recurrence
of such sexual assaults. Importantly for the rest of this Article, much of
the litigation would be consumed with proof of the connections be-
tween those policies and practices-that is, the governance of the
football team-and the purposes of the football team. That is, under a
state ERA challenge, the burden would be squarely on the university to
justify the way football works for it (if it does).
227. Another example, Jennings v. City of Stillwater, is an excellent demonstration of the
inadequacy of federal law, and will be discussed in Part IV.B.1.
228. COLO. CONST. art. II, § 3. The Colorado Inalienable Rights clause had its heyday in
the federal constitutional protective era of freedom of contract. DALE A. OESTEa-E &
RICHARD B. COLLINS, THE COLORADO STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE
33 (2002). The Colorado Constitution does not contain an equal protection clause;
rather, the guarantee of equal protection has been judicially inferred to emanate from
the state constitutional guarantee of due process.
229. COLO. CONST. art. 9, § 2. Though the education clause is litigated almost exclusively
in the context of local school district funding, no case says the clause has no applica-
tion to higher education. The word "thorough" might apply to an obligation to
reduce violence and to teach gender literacy. At the least, this clause suggests that the
Colorado constitution focuses on education more seriously than does the federal con-
stitution.
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A. Preliminary Doctrines
As discussed in Section III.D supra, federal courts in Title IX sexual
assault cases have gotten bollixed up about plaintiffs' standing. That has
been particularly so where plaintiffs seek injunctive relief, and I will have
more to say about that in Section VD infra. In the meantime, Colorado
law has been clearer than federal law about the preliminary doctrines
that would be relevant in the case I hypothesize, particularly the doc-
trines of standing and mootness.
Colorado cases consistently say that state courts are not bound by
the strictures of Article III of the United States Constitution.230 The
standing inquiry is not co-extensive with the federal inquiry; the Colo-
rado doctrine is more expansive than the federal doctrine." Colorado
courts have wisely not extended standing doctrine to the question of
whether all parts of a judicially-imposed remedy will provide relief to a
particular individual plaintiff in the future. Rather, the Colorado in-
quiry has only two parts: (1) whether the plaintiff was injured in fact;
and (2) whether the injury was to a legally protected interest.232 Thus, a
plaintiff in the hypothesized gang-rape situation would have standing in
a Colorado court to assert a violation of the Colorado Equal Rights
Amendment. She was injured by the rape; her freedom from rape is le-
gally protected, in the educational and in all other contexts; as a student,
she was legally entitled to adequate governance of the football team and
adequate protection by university officials.
Colorado cases are also mercifully clear about the difference be-
tween standing and mootness. Colorado has specifically announced that
injuries to students are a paradigmatic example of cases that are not
moot because they are "capable of repetition yet evading review." Stu-
dents graduate. However, pre-trial procedures, trials themselves, and
appeals processes take time. It should not be necessary for other students
to initiate and litigate other cases in order for an on-going illegality to be
remedied. 233 Even when the underlying legality has allegedly been volun-
tarily remedied by the defendants, the matter should not necessarily be
dismissed as moot, and that is particularly so when the underlying matter
230. Wimberly v. Ettenberg, 570 P.2d 535 (Colo. 1977). Standing is still a state constitu-
tional requirement. Id.
231. Grossman v. Dean, 80 P.3d 952, 959 (Colo. Ct. App. 2003).
232. Maurer v. Young Life, 779 P.2d 1317, 1323 (Colo. 1989); accord Durdin v. Chey-
enne Mountain Bank, 98 P.3d 899, 902 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004), cert. denied, 204
Colo. Lexis 752 (Oct. 4, 2004).
233. Trinidad Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Lopez, 963 P.2d 1095, 1102 (Colo. 1998).
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is of great public importance, 2" as I assume the allegation of a state
funded "rape culture" at a flagship university would be.
Every state constitution has room to move on these preliminary
doctrines. If plaintiffs have to litigate them preliminarily to achieving
substantive changes in constitutional sex law, that is what plaintiffs will
have to do.
B. Interpretation of State Prohibitions on Sex Discrimination
Most state ERAs and comparable constitutional provisions are rela-
tively un-interpreted. The Colorado Equal Rights Amendment is no
exception, and it stands ready for a test of real seriousness. Unsurpris-
ingly, most cases decided under the Colorado ERA (as in other states)
235
so far have involved simple "formal equality" problems, where a law or
practice on its face has differentiated between men and women. These
cases did not require too much vision. For example, a gender-specific
statutory regime, since repealed, provided that biological mothers had a
certain period of years to establish paternity of a child, but that a bio-
logical father had no standing to establish his own paternity while the
biological mother was married to another. The Colorado Supreme
Court held that the ERA required that the claiming biological father
have the same time for judicial access as the biological mother.23 16 Most
other Colorado ERA cases are of similar (at least what seems to us now)
logical simplicity.
237
234. Grossman, 80 P.3d at 960.
235. JENNIFER FRIESEN, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: LITIGATING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS,
CLAIMS AND DEFENSES §§ 3-12 (3rd ed. 2000).
236. R. McG. and C W v. I. W and W W, 615 P.2d 666 (Colo. 1980) (en banc). The
state's justification for the regime was an interest in promoting the stability of existing
family units. Id. at 670. In what was a harbinger of feminist debates then-emerging
and continuing today, then-Justice Jean Dubofsky (who was also lead counsel for
plaintiffs in Romer v. Evans) stated in a special concurrence: "I believe that the legisla-
ture may give preference in paternity proceedings to a mother's family unit in which
the child resides without running afoul of constitutional guarantees of equal protec-
tion. Usually, no one questions the identity of the mother because of the mother's
pregnancy and delivery of the child. Paternity is not as easy to determine." According
to Justice Dubofsky, the defect lay in the conclusive presumption against a putative
father's attempt to establish paternity. Id.
237. In re Matter of the Estate of Musso, 932 P.2d 853 (Colo. Ct. App. 1997) (ERA pro-
hibits application of the common law presumption that a husband solely owns all
household goods); In re Marriage of Trask, 580 P.2d 825 (Colo. Ct. App.), cert. de-
nied (Jul. 3, 1978) (ERA does not prohibit trial court from awarding attorneys' fees
to wife in dissolution action, nor require an order that the pregnant wife have to get a
job); In re Marriage of Franks, 542 P.2d 845 (Colo. 1975) (in a case brought by a
[Vol. 15:205
STUDENT GLADIATORS AND SEXUAL ASSAULT
There are two other Colorado cases interpreting the state ERA that
are more germane to the cause of action that I model in this Article.
First is People v. Salinas,239 which in 1976 upheld a conviction of a man
pursuant to a statutory rape statute which was then sex-specific. The
defendant had sexual intercourse with two sisters, ages 12 and 17. At the
time, the Colorado statute provided that "[a]ny male who has sexual
intercourse with a female not his spouse commits rape, if... the female
is less than sixteen years old and the offender is a least two years older
than the female." 240 The defendant appealed inter alia on ERA grounds.
The Colorado Supreme Court ruled that the statute did not violate the
ERA.
As noted, the Colorado Legislature has since amended the law to
make it sex neutral. Also, at the time, that holding was consistent with
Federal Equal Protection doctrine. What I want to note is this lan-
guage: "[The ERA] prohibits unequal treatment based exclusively on the
circumstance of sex, social stereotypes connected with gender, and culturally
induced dissimilarities.2 12 These words express a deeply feminist under-
standing of equality theory. It is not just about stilted lists of "real"
differences en route to a finding of "similar situation." Equality can be
about physical differences, but is more often about socially constructed
institutions of femininity and masculinity, more about power than
husband seeking to avoid divorce, the court held that Colorado's "no-fault" divorce
regime does not violate ERA, nor guarantee of due process of law, nor protection
against impairment of contracts, nor prohibition on slavery).
238. There is a third case that could have been germane, Duong v. County ofArapahoe, 837
P.2d 226 (Colo. Ct. App.), cert. denied (Oct. 13, 1992), because I believe domestic
violence is a matter of sex discrimination. In that tragic case, a husband murdered his
estranged wife in the county courthouse just prior to a hearing about the dissolution
of their marriage. He had previously threatened violence against her, there was a re-
straining order in effect, and the judge in the dissolution proceeding had ordered
extra security for her. The security just hadn't shown up in time. Her children lost
their civil case against the county largely on grounds of the federal due process doc-
trine, recently and woefully reiterated by the U.S. Supreme Court in a case out of
Colorado, that a mother in possession of a domestic violence protective order had no
constitutional right that it actually be enforced, Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545
U.S. 748 (2005). In that case, the plaintiffs ex-husband killed their three little girls
while in violation of the order. Counsel in Duong did not make the record for an
ERA challenge, 837 P.2d at 230, so I will not discuss the Duong case further in this
context.
239. People v. Salinas, 551 P.2d 703 (Colo. 1976) (en banc).
240. Salinas, 551 P.2d at 705 n.2. In 1975, probably in response to ratification of the state
ERA, the legislature amended the statute to prohibit both males and females from
engaging in sexual intercourse with persons less than fifteen years old. Id. at 705 n.3,
(citing Colo. Rev. Stat. 18-3- 4 03(1)(e).
241. Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
242. Salinas, 551 P.2d at 706 (emphasis added).
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about logic. If Colorado sticks with the quoted language and embraces
the implications, that state is way ahead of all federal and most state
courts in enforcing the constitutional command of sex equality.
The second case is one of the most important decisions of any state
Supreme Court in the equality arena. In Colorado Civil Rights Commis-
sion v. Travelers Insurance Co., the Colorado Supreme Court in 1988
upheld a decision of the state Civil Rights Commission that for an in-
surer and employer to exclude the medical expenses of "normal
pregnancy" in a group health insurance policy was sex discrimination.
This case is extraordinary both because of its relatively early vintage and
its refusal, in the pregnancy context, to rely on shallow federal equality
theory.
The decision was primarily based upon the Colorado discrimina-
tion statute that prohibits sex discrimination in the terms and
conditions of employment. To hold that the state statute covered preg-
nancy discrimination, however, the Court had to reject the reasoning of
the United States Supreme Court that neither the Equal Protection
Clause of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution 24 4 nor
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964245 prohibited discrimination on
the basis of pregnancy.
In Travelers, the Colorado Supreme Court acted with common
sense and in accord with its authority as the ultimate interpreter of
Colorado statutes and constitutional provisions. The Court took on the
U.S. Supreme Court's prior cynicism (with due regard to how Congress
had reversed one of that Court's decisions by amending Title VII), and
put the prior illogic in logical perspective: "The argument that such a
plan did not discriminate because all pregnant people are treated alike is
refuted by the plan's inherently discriminatory designation of the recipi-
ent class-the exclusion of all women from reimbursement for the costs
of treatment of a physiological condition affecting only women.,
2 4 6
The logic being corrected, the Colorado Supreme Court went on to
write these important words:
Reliance on [the federal decision] is particularly inappropriate
as a means of interpreting the provisions of [the Colorado
243. Travelers, 759 P.2d 1358 (Colo. 1988) (en banc).
244. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974); accord Bray v. Alexandria Women's Clinic,
506 U.S. 264 (1993).
245. General Electric v. Gilbert, 429 U.S 125 (1976). Congress reacted almost immedi-
ately to reverse the Supreme Court's interpretation of Tide VII by enacting the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978. For a fuller analysis of the chain of events, see
Ann Scales, Towards a Feminist Jurisprudence, 56 IND. L. J. 375 (1981).
246. Travelers, 759 P.2d at 1363.
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anti-discrimination statute] in light of the fact that Colorado
constitutional provisions provide additional prohibitions
against sex discrimination not present in the United States
Constitution ... [The state ERA] prohibits unequal treatment
based solely on circumstances of sex ... and requires that leg-
islative classifications based exclusively on sexual status receive
the closest judicial scrutiny... The Equal Rights Amendment
necessarily guides us in interpreting the requirements of [the
statute]. 247
Note three aspects of this paragraph. First, Colorado has declared
its independence from cramped federal notions of equality, which is
made easier when the state constitution contains unique language. Sec-
ond, the Court required the highest level of judicial scrutiny in ERA
cases, whereas, of course, the federal courts require only "intermediate
scrutiny" of sex discrimination claims brought under the federal Equal
Protection clause. Third, the Court shows determination in making the
ERA real when it says that the ERA "necessarily" guides it in interpreta-
tion of state statutes. This last item is a big deal because it is
commonplace for other courts to interpret statutes deferentially when
no constitutional questions are necessarily raised. There was no constitu-
tional question in Travelers: rather, the Colorado Court expressed a
purposive understanding of its job. It saw that because the voters have
commanded sex equality, the Court is obliged to make it happen
throughout Colorado law.
1. Rejecting Federal Law
[Ilmagine a world in which there is no federal law.
-Jennifer Friesen
248
It is axiomatic that state courts, in interpreting their own consti-
tutions are not bound by federal interpretations of similar provisions
in the federal constitution. Federal constitutional provisions and inter-
pretations provide only the "floor" beneath which state interpretations
cannot fall. The Colorado Supreme Court has not been shy about de-
claring its independence from federal law.
247. Travelers, 759 P.2d at 1363 (citations omitted).
248. FRIESEN, supra note 235, at 61.
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As an example of the mean parsimony of federal constitutional
law, consider another case out of the "Big XII" conference, Jennings v.
City of Stillwater.2 9 Ms. Jennings was allegedly gang-raped by four
Oklahoma State University football players at a party in November of
1999. She admitted that she was intoxicated and that she may have
consented to sex with one of the football players. She insisted, how-
ever, that she most certainly would not have consented to having sex
with all four of them at the same time.250
Ms. Jennings sued the local police department for lax investiga-
tion of a criminal complaint against football players because they were
football players. 21 The investigating officer-extraordinarily named
Detective Buzzard-was a 1994 OSU graduate who had had an ath-
letic scholarship. His cousin was OSU's director of media relations.
Though Buzzard interviewed the four football players separately, he
may have allowed them to meet together before the interviews, and he
never again questioned them. When he interviewed Ms. Jennings, he
told her that "numerous people," who turned out to be the football
players themselves, contradicted her account. Detective Buzzard con-
vinced Ms. Jennings to sign a "waiver of prosecution.,
25 2
In his deposition, Detective Buzzard testified that he had never
used a waiver of prosecution form in any of the other fifty rape inves-
tigations in which he had been involved, none of which involved OSU
athletes.5 There were a number of other failures to follow up on inves-
tigative leads, all of which privileged the football players' unrecorded
and perhaps previously agreed-upon accounts to Detective Buzzard.
The local District Attorney declined to prosecute the athletes on any
charges, based upon Detective Buzzard's "work."
249. Jennings v. City of Stillwater, 383 F. 3d 1199 (10th Cir. 2004).
250. Jennings, 383 F.3d at 1202.
251. Ms. Jennings settled her civil claims against the players and against Oklahoma State
University. Id. at 1205. Otherwise, she might have had a statutory Title IX claim that
would allow her to allege a "hostile educational environment" against the university, a
claim that nominally does not require a showing of "intentional" sex discrimination.
Of course, as explained supra, though the idea of a "hostile environment" claim in Ti-
tle VII sexual harassment law coalesced around the point of view of the harassed, thus
requiring no showing of intention on the point of view of the harasser, the U.S. Su-
preme Court in the Title IX context turned that completely around, requiring that
the plaintiff show actual knowledge and deliberate indifference on the part of the in-
stitutional defendant, a requirement of showing intent if ever there were one.
252. Ms. Jennings retracted the "waiver of prosecution," but signed a similar document
later because of fear of the media and an unwillingness to meet her attackers in court.
Jennings, 383 F.3d at 1202.
253. Jennings, 383 F.3d at 1200-01.
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Ms. Jennings brought suit against the Stillwater, Oklahoma, po-
lice department on three federal theories: deprivation of procedural
due process, denial of access to the courts, and deprivation of equal
protection on account of sex. The district court granted summary
judgment to the police department, and the Tenth Circuit affirmed.'
4
Here, I would like to address only Ms. Jennings' equal protection
claim. Under present federal law, it could not be a "sex discrimination"
claim. She could not claim that the police department investigated
rapes of men but not rapes of women. Her claim was that the depart-
ment gave special treatment to college athletes in the way it
investigated this rape. This is the trap of "similar situation" in U.S.
constitutional equality doctrine. The only relevant classification she
could point to was "rape suspects who are OSU athletes" versus "rape
suspects who are not OSU athletes." Under federal law, she was
doomed.255 Even if she could have gotten the federal court to acknowl-
edge that distinction, only "rational relationship" scrutiny would have
applied, and the police department could have invented innumerable
reasons for treating this case differently.
Ms. Jennings and her lawyers, however, could not even get the
panel of the Tenth Circuit to acknowledge that important distinc-
tion-between rape by athletes and rape by non-athletes. Instead, the
Tenth Circuit panel went out of its way to call Ms. Jennings a slut.
Look at what this panel did consider as the relevant points of compari-
son:
Nowhere in the over 550 pages of evidence submitted by
Plaintiff to the district court does she supply any information
regarding the allegedly similarly situated rape victims. What
were the relative strengths of those cases? In how many was
the victim's consent a central issue? Did other victims admit
to being drunk? Did the rapes occur in a party setting? Did
any other victim state that she would have trouble identify-
ing the perpetrators? Were the other cases serial rapes where
the victim admitted that she would have probably consented
to sex with at least one of the suspects?
256
As if the local authorities would have just have given up all those facts in
civil discovery (particularly given privacy issues involved). As if the facts
demanded were directly relevant to the claim of unequal preferential
254. Jennings, 383 F.3d at 1200-01.
255. Jennings, 383 F. 3d at 1210.
256. Jennings, 383 F.3d at 1215 (emphasis in original).
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treatment for football players, when the department had already ad-
mitted differential treatment by its investigator. Remember, the
Jennings opinion resulted from a summary judgment motion. As a civil
procedure teacher, I must add that this case was a disgraceful abuse of
F.R.C.P. Rule 56.
Federal constitutional notions of "equality" allow this sort of stuff
to go on. State courts can do much better.
2. Is it Sex Discrimination?
Ordinarily, in order for any state's gender-protective constitu-
tional provisions to apply, the plaintiff must show that the actions
complained of constitute a denial or abridgement of rights "on account
of sex." In federal equal protection law, sex discrimination has gener-
ally been understood as a logical-almost mathematical concept-to
wit, a requirement that what happened to this woman would not and
even could not have happened if she had been a man."'
Rejecting cramped notions of federal constitutional law, state
courts are free to understand big-time collegiate football as a deeply
gendered institution. They are free to name specific policies and prac-
tices as sex discriminatory, if the evidence shows that a specific policy
or practice is an instance of unequal treatment based exclusively on the
circumstance of sex, sexual stereotypes connected with gender, and cultur-
ally induced dissimilarities, prohibited, for example, by the Colorado
state Equal Rights Amendment.!
As a legal matter, such a recognition would entail at least one ad-
ditional step beyond what Colorado has already actually held. In
257. In the federal statutory context, that formalistic understanding of equality does not
apply, not only because civil rights statutes (with the exception of Title IX) carry
modes of proof by "disproportionate impact" without a showing of intention to dis-
criminate, but also because even the United States Supreme Court is beginning to get
feminist jurisprudence. In Oncale v. Sundowner Offihore Servs., 523 U.S. 75 (1998), a
unanimous Court allowed that a man could state a Title VII sexual harassment claim
when he had worked in an all-male environment (there, an off-shore oil rig), without
having to prove that either he or his harassers were gay. It was not the biological fact
of his sex, nor any actual overtures for sexual conduct, but the demeaning sexualized
gendering of the working environment that constituted the sex discrimination, of
which sexual harassment is simply a subset. It didn't matter that the co-workers
might have treated a female roughneck the same way. It was about feminizing the
plaintiff because of the co-workers' needed to masculinize themselves. Unstated by
the United States Supreme Court, but necessarily implied, is that there are gendered
institutions and practices that produce unlawful sex discriminatory results, harmful to
women as women and harmful to men as men, and harmful to gender equality.
258. See People v. Salinas, 551 P.2d 703 (Colo. 1976) (en banc).
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Travelers, the Colorado State Supreme Court might be said simply to
have rejected some silly logic. In that case, it said that discrimination
on the basis of pregnancy by necessity entailed sex discrimination, be-
cause only women can get pregnant.
Of course, that "unique physical characteristics" stuff is not what is
going on in the football situation. Rather, a case would typically be
brought regarding a policy of protecting football players from investiga-
tion of or punishment for sexual offenses. Of course, the risks imposed
by such a policy could befall male victims. It would be, however, rela-
tively easy to prove that those risks fell hugely disproportionately on
women.
Defense counsel in such a case would strenuously urge the state
court to follow federal equal protection law, and require a showing of
intent to discriminate (that is, in addition to "disproportionate im-
pact," no matter how great), in order to state a claim of sex
259 odiscrimination. " But of course state courts are not bound by federal
interpretations of the equal protection clause in interpreting their state
constitutions' clauses. Indeed, at least three states have expressly held
that "disproportionate impact" on one sex is enough to state a claim
under their respective ERAs.26 °
I would not leave it at that. The risks presented are not about
stilted logic, nor about statistics. They are about deeply gendered cur-
rents in institutions of violence. If the open secret isn't exposed, the
court will not see that football can be a special institution of enforced
masculinity. Thus, in addition to introducing historical, sociological,
and psychological evidence about the origins and effects of football, I
would introduce evidence and make arguments about what genderiza-
tion is and does, and how sexual assault is a key ingredient in that
261potent brew. It is only there that the raison d'etre of anti-
discrimination law is illuminated. It is only there that a court could
realize the full potential of a prior pronouncement that the state ERA
259. Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 269 (1979) (upholding Massa-
chusetts veterans' preference in civil service statute against Equal Protection challenge
even though it benefited an "overwhelmingly male class").
260. Those states are Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, and Washington. Cf Snider v. Thorn-
burgh, 436 A.2d 593 (Pa. 1981); Buchanan v. Dir. Div. Emp. Sec., 471 N.E.2d 345
(Mass. 1984) (acknowledging but not applying disproportionate impact theory);
State v. Brayman, 751 P.2d 294, 303-05 (Wash. 1988) (en banc).
261. Here I would be taking a page out of the Oncale book, supra note 189. See particu-
larly Brief for National Organization of Male Sexual Victimization et al as Aimic
Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Oncale v. Sundowner Offihore Servs., 253 U.S. 75, 81
(1998) (authored by Catharine A. MacKinnon, available at 8 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 9
(1997)).
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prohibited "sexual stereotypes connected with gender, and culturally in-
duced dissimilarities."
C Applying the State Constitutional Provisions
Assuming a court has found football policies and practices to be
forms of sex discrimination, the next steps would be for the institu-
tional defendant to attempt to justify the policies or practices of the
football program which have been identified as risky. The state inter-
ests in having those practices and policies would be connected through
the notion that the "big-time" football in general, that the resources
devoted to the football program, and that the specific practices and
policies of the football program and university are all necessary to that
specific university's educational mission.
No one contends that a university exists solely for the life of the
mind. The propriety in the curriculum of "physical education," a term
that came into political currency with the Presidency of John Kennedy,
is not a matter of dispute among educators. In the broadest sense,
physical education is not just about health, but about the joy of physi-
cal competence, and the intellectual, emotional, and spiritual
empowerment that comes with that. Excellence in athletics can bring
something like transcendence to an individual, as many athletes attest.
Since women have historically been denied the training in educational
institutions that get them to such a level, it is marvelous that Title IX's
command of equal educational opportunities extends to athletics.
That basic notion of physical education doesn't apply to football,
however, because, though the rosters are disproportionately large com-
pared to other college sports, the real numbers of students who can get
to that level are disproportionately very small."' Organized football at
the level of Division I-A college play-and even at many high
schools-requires such expenditures and physical minima per player,
that it is extraordinarily unlikely that anyone's son will ever play it.
This is one characteristic by which we can designate college football a
"hegemonic" sport. There are proportionately few players; most are
followers, watchers, internalizers of the spectacle. Thus, university jus-
tifications for having big-time football cannot proceed from the point
262. Only 6 or 7% of high school football players every play in college. Roughly 8% of all
draft-eligible college football and basketball players are drafted by the pros, and only
2% ever sign a professional contract. MICHAEL A. MESSNER, POWER AT PLAY: SPORTS
AND THE PROBLEM OF MASCULINITY 45 (1992).
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of view of physical education. The university justification must pro-
ceed from the point of view of what football does for the university.
As noted before, the Colorado Supreme Court has stated that
strict scrutiny applies to challenges under the state Equal Rights
Amendment, as a majority of state courts interpreting their ERAs have
done . I have attempted to imagine the "compelling state interests"
that the state would introduce in defense of the football program as it
is. There could be other interests, but I believe they boil down to some
version of these three. Because none of those interests actually holds
water as "compelling," I will not devote a separate section in this Arti-
cle to whether or not any such state interest could meet the second
part of the strict scrutiny test, that is, whether the football program as
it is the least drastic alternative to achieve those state interests.
1. The State Interest in Revenue Production
Though no one denies that football is infernally expensive, 264 de-
fenders of big-time football offer that on balance it is a "revenue
producer" for the university, or at least that it is subsidizing other
sports. That position is usually wrong. Some football programs are
profitable, but most big-time college football programs require univer-
sities to cannibalize general university funds to make up for football
deficits. And most universities cook the books to make football look
profitable. It is often done by putting police protection and parking
for games, general department utilities and maintenance, and, most
importantly, debt service on athletic facilities on the university's tab,
and then by "zeroing out" the athletic department budget at the end of
each fiscal year.265
Far more importantly, the profit discussion is constitutionally
irrelevant. In traditional universities, both public and private, no
individual departments are expected to make money. In the football
situation, however, profit-making is presented as a defense to sex
discrimination. Under the constitutional challenge that I propose, this
popular defense would have to be explicated further. First, the
263. Wharton, supra note 222, at 1239-47.
264. For example, when sometime football power Wisconsin played in the Rose Bowl in
1999, it got a total of $1.8 million in television royalties and other fees, but the
school had almost $2.1 in expenses, including a traveling party of 832 people to the
game. SPERBER, supra note 159, at 222. Professor Sperber reports that, in the year he
published his book, even the mighty Michigan football program ran a deficit. Id. at
220.
265. SPERBER, supra note 159 at 220-22.
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institution would have the burden to convince a court that profit
should ever be a defense to educational discrimination, i.e. that the
profit was so fundamental to the educational mission as to constitute a
"compelling" interest. Second, the institution would have the burden
of showing that its football program actually makes money, with close
attention given to university budgetary strategies. Third, the
institution would have the burden of showing that the funding defense
is the "least drastic alternative"-that the institution has no other
means whatsoever to accomplish its educational (or even athletic)
goals. I do not think it would be factually possible for any university to
meet that burden.
2. The State Interest in Group Cohesion: Something to
Cheer and Talk About
Unquestionably, big-time college sports induce a sort of cohesion.
I admitted early in this Article about being a thrilled kid at Oklahoma
football games. Several family members who live in Oklahoma still
attend the games, and enjoy them as gargantuan social occasions.
Other than seeing old friends, however, what were we thrilled about?
What are we doing there? I think the interest in group cohesion breaks
down, more or less, into a spectrum of interests, some very positive
and some not so positive, that would come into a full discussion of the
role of football in college life.
First, football can be a beautiful thing to observe. Like any physi-
cal feats well-executed by talented athletes, it can be breathtaking in its
power, speed, grace, and of course, well-coordinated plans. These guys
are good. But the collective experience of football isn't primarily about
the planning and kinetic amazement, any more than "Playboy" is
about the interviews.
Second, more importantly, is something clumped under the ru-
bric of "school pride." When it is time for the big game, students bond
together among themselves and with the larger community of faculty,
administrators, alumni, and sometimes troubling, the "boosters.,
266
Under this theory, they all have fun together and scream their heads
off in a collective demonstration of school spirit. It is not altogether
clear what this actually means for these various groups.
266. Part of the bonding, of course, is to give students and alumni something to talk to
each other about. It sometimes strikes me as an example of Kurt Vonnegut's invented
category, the "granfalloon," "a seeming team that [is] meaningless in terms of the
ways God gets things done." KuRT VONNEGUT, CAT'S CRADLE 91 (2006) (1963).
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As I explained at length above, the gendered nature of football it-
self is a bizarre and potentially destructive message to male and femalem"/ 261
fans and athletes alike. More generally, Professor Sperber's research
indicates that students are veritably schizophrenic about their big-time
sports teams. They are sophisticated and cynical about what really goes
on. They resent the special treatment given to (and particularly special
admission standards for) athletes, resent as well the special treatment
given to alums and donors when the students themselves can't get tick-
ets to athletic events. But those same students go nuts for their teams,
at least while those teams are winning. At what point, Professor Sper-
ber asks, does this student "double-think" turn into an inability to
distinguish between reality and fantasy?68 I would put the problem
more specifically: big-time sports are a very direct lesson to students
that institutions can purport to do one thing, but actually do some-
thing very different. Not exactly the best civics curriculum.
In addition, students and others should also inquire into how
much they are being manipulated by big-time spectator sports. Early
in the political philosophy fundamental to the American Republic,
Adam Smith extolled sports as a mechanism to check the power of fa-
natical religious sects. From those political philosophies through
neo-Marxist accounts of sport, theorists have postulated that sports
siphon off political discontent that might otherwise lead to serious
challenges to the status quo.2 70 An important criticism of college sports
is to the same effect: big time sports detract from the fact that many
267. The gendered aspect of fandom is described in NICK HORNBY, FEVER PITCH 22-23
(1992), about the author's lifelong obsession with the U.K. football (soccer) club Ar-
senal. In a narrative of relative joylessness, Hornby embraces the great benefit of
instant camaraderie with other males:
And yes, I am aware of the downside of this wonderful facility that men
have: they become repressed, they fail in their relationships with women,
their conversation is trivial and boorish, they find themselves unable to ex-
press their emotional needs, they cannot relate to their children, and they
die lonely and miserable. But, you know, what the hell? If you can walk
into a school full of eight hundred boys, most of them older, all of them
bigger, without feeling intimidated, simply because you have a spare
Jimmy Husband [soccer trading card] in your blazer pocket, then it seems
like a trade-off worth making.
Id. That trade-off may turn sour in the long run. MESSNER, supra note 262.
268. SPERBER, supra note 159, at 241-43.
269. GoRaN & GOLDSTEIN, supra note 43, at 13.
270. Id.; T.R. Young, The Sociology of Sport: Structural Marxist and Cultural Marxist Ap-
proaches, 29 SOCIOLOGICAi PERSPECTIVES 3 (1996).
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universities have consistently diverted resources away from under-
graduate education.27
Finally, there are downsides to the screaming crowds. For all that
universities do to put a happy face on the enterprise, football games
can be very scary. There is loss of individuality in a group endeavor;
there is that moment when the group becomes a collective being. Both
of these can be good things. But the group can also become a monster.
An unthinking thing. A thing that becomes sure of its own invincibil-
ity.
We like to think that the violence that can emerge from the mon-
ster morph is confined to the horrific soccer riots of the last decade or
so. 272 But it isn't. It is also the thing that causes increased sexual assaults
and property damages after The Big Game at many U.S. colleges-
enhanced when the home team wins. 273 A blind faith in invincibility is
the stuff of historic tragedies, and it has to be learned somewhere. Dis-
cerning the difference between courage and recklessness (that Aristotle
urged as a fundamental virtue) must be one of the primary aims of
education.
Under a state constitutional strict scrutiny standard, this state in-
terest in providing something to cheer and talk about must be
compelling. In the largest possible sense, of course it is. Student en-
gagement in their educational experience means everything. But,
keeping in mind that the burden is on the defendant to show that the
compelling interest cannot be achieved in a less discriminatory way,
this interest, as well, will fail to pass constitutional muster. Providing
students something to cheer and talk about could be accomplished by
far less risky athletic endeavors, not to mention by providing a first-
rate education.
3. The State Interest in Catharsis
I suspect that, at some level, conventional wisdom always falls
back on the idea that big-time college sports are otherwise harmless
271. SPERBER, supra note 159.
272. See generally STEVE FROSDICK, FOOTBALL HOOLIGANISM (2005).
273. Miranda Hitti, Sports Fan Violence Follows Victory: When Favored Team Wins, Sports
Fan Violence Rises, WEBMD MEDICAL NEWS (March 30, 2005), http://
men.webmd.com/news/20050330/sports-fan-violence-follows-victory;; see also JERRY
M. LEWIS, SPORTS FAN VIOLENCE IN NORTH AMERICA 85-104 (2007); JOHN H.
KERR, RETHINKING AGGRESSION AND VIOLENCE IN SPORT 94-113 (2004).
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amusements274 that allow young people who are otherwise busy getting
educated to "let off steam." Education is about socialization and disci-
pline, so this argument goes, about learning conformity Monday
through Friday. Football weekends are when players and students (and
alumni and boosters) converge to let their hair down to express emo-
tions and perform behaviors that they may be unable to express and
perform at other times.
The catharsis argument should be of particular interest to institu-
tions of higher learning, given its classical pedigree. Plato and Aristotle
disagreed about the effects of imitative spectacle (writing specifically
about poetry, comedy and tragedy). Plato decried the corrupting effect
of all imitation of human experience on consumers, regardless of the
greatness of the imitators. For the great idealist Plato, life was a jour-
ney from illusion to reality, and every imitation of life increased the
difficulty of the journey. Depictions of cruel acts, for example, were
diversions and temptations to cruelty. 5
Aristotle, on the other hand, wrote that viewing tragic plays
(structured imitations of acts of cruelty, violence, and despair) could
have a purgative effect:
Tragedy is an imitation of an action that is serious, complete,
and possessing magnitude; in embellished language, each
kind of which is used separately in the different parts; in the
mode of action and not narrated; and effecting through pity
276and fear [what we call] the catharsis of such emotions.
Though Aristotle promised to explain the concept of catharsis, he
never systematically did so. Scholars disagree about what the concept
means in the larger context of his philosophy-of particular relevance
here, to his philosophy of the education of responsible citizens.
I am not a classicist, but understand the disagreement as one
about thick and thicker versions of catharsis. The less-thick version
would hold that it appears to be only the "relief that comes from giv-
ing way to the emotions in an intense emotional experience ... a
temporary psychological effect without moral consequences. ,271 In the
thicker version, scholars focus on the specificity of the emotions pity
274. George Will, April Please Come Soon, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 27, 2006, at 68 (referring to
NCAA "March Madness" basketball tournament as part of "public stock of harmless
pleasure").
275. 10 PlATO, THE REPUBLIC § 605 (Allan Bloom, trans., 1968) (380 B.C.); SISSElA
BOK, MAYHEM: VIOLENCE AS PUBLIC ENTERTAINMENT 40-41.(1998).
276. ARISTOTLE, THE POETICS § 1449b Games Hutton trans, 1982) (335 B.C.).
277. Id. at 89 (notes by translator).
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and fear,278 and the "proper purgation" of them.279 In this view, catharsis
is a "schooling of the emotions and a deepening of one's understanding
of human nature and of the paradoxes relating to the role of violence
in human life., 210 It is a moral experience available only to those ma-
ture enough to confront it. 28 ' In my view, that version of catharsis is
fundamental to education in citizenship and mature moral life.
Note, however, in neither view is catharsis the gruel-thin, essen-
tially liberal notion implied by the phrase "letting off steam." For
Aristotle, expressing emotion is not expression of emotion for expres-
sion's sake, willy-nilly. Unlike some contemporary civil libertarians,
Aristotle did not say that all expressions are inevitable, so we should
give up on their content and frequency. As another classical scholar
noted, the Athenians would not indulge in a daily diet of imitative
spectacle lest they suffer "emotional dysentery.
282
I'll admit it: at no point in his complete works does Aristotle ever
mention American college football.283 I apologize to classical scholars
who regard the leap from tragic theater to American football as ille-
gitimate on its face. I focus on the concept of catharsis because, as
above, I believe some watered-down version of it has been the primary
justification for big-time intercollegiate sports. And thus, I am in
agreement with Sissela Bok who, writing about the perpetual diet of
violence fed to young people by the U.S. media (in sports as well as
278. "Let fear, then, be a kind of pain or disturbance resulting from the imagination of
impending danger, either destructive or painful." ARISTOTLE, THE ART OF RHETORIC
§ 1382a (H.C. Lawson-Tancred trans., 1991) (4th cen. B.C.). "Let pity then, be a
certain pain occasioned by an apparently destructive evil or pain's occurring to one
who does not deserve it." Id. § 1385b. Note that these definitions require the capac-
ity to make complex judgments, among other things, of what is impending, what is
danger, what is pain, what is evil, and what it is to deserve or not to deserve evil or
pain.
279. ARISTOTLE, THE POETICS, Chapter 6, 1449b, tr. S.H. Butcher, in WALTER JACKSON
BATE, CRITICISM: THE MAJOR TEXTS 22 (1970).
280. BOK, supra note 275, at 43.
281. Id.
282. ARISTOTLE, POETICS xiii, tr. W. Hamilton Frye (1973) (translator's introduction)
(quoted in BOK, supra note 275, at 167 n. 72).
283. Aristotle warns of the dangers of over-athleticism in education (with a jab at Sparta):
Nobility of character, rather than ferocity of temper, should take pride of
place.... To let youth run wild in savage pursuits, and to leave them un-
trained in the disciplines they really need, is really to degrade them into
vulgarity. It is to make them serve the statesman's purpose in one respect,
and one only; and even there, as our argument shows, it is to make them of
less service than those who have been differently trained.
ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS § 1338b9 (Ernest Barker trans., 1995) (4th cen. B.C.).
[Vol. 15:205
STUDENT GLADIATORS AND SEXUAL ASSAULT
other entertainment packaging), insists that we take a closer look at
the effects of that diet.
Every part of the "letting off steam" argument is demonstrably
false. For one thing, it implies that excessive expressions and perform-
ances on football weekends are somehow reduced at other times.
Teachers at the big-time universities are fully aware, however, of the
phenomenon of the "perpetual weekend." Students miss classes and/or
are hungover through each day of each athletic season.
More importantly, the "letting of steam" argument accepts the
Freudian premise that violence is instinctual and unavoidable: it is in-
herent within our species and must be discharged periodically. The
instinct theory of aggression is a hotly contested, now highly nuanced
debate. In any case it seems both irresponsible and dangerous for edu-
cational institutions implicitly to accept it in defense of athletics. First,
it promotes the idea that one way to prevent violence is to expose peo-
ple to non-lethal alternatives to criminal or military violence, such as
football.284 There are no data I have found to support such a view. In
one cross-cultural study on the subject, Professor Richard Sipes found
that societies that played the most combative, physically violent games
also engaged in the most warfare. The forms of violence reinforce each
other.285 Moreover, the instinct theory enables those who wish to es-
cape responsibility, and discourages education for those who might be
helped by recognizing that their violent expressions are a cover for un-
acknowledged and unmet needs. 2" Finally, the evidence to date
overwhelmingly suggests that the theory is simply untrue. Football
doesn't reduce violence. As noted sports historian Allen Guttmann put
it, with obvious regret:
It is a great pity that the catharsis theory is invalid. There is
some evidence to indicate that the players themselves are less
aggressive after the game than before the kickoff, an effect
which may result mostly from the enormous amount of
energy expended during the actual encounter, but there is a
rare consensus among psychologists apropos of the alleged
catharsis experienced by the spectators.287
284. GILLIGAN, supra note 149, at 212.
285. Id.; see also Richard G. Sipes, War, Sports and Aggression: An Empirical Test of Two
Rival Theories, 75 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 64 (1973).
286. GILLIGAN, supra note 149, at 213.
287. GUTrMANN, supra note 48, at 131, 180-81 (citing studies agreeing that catharsis
theory is invalid).
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It is a pity indeed that the catharsis theory is invalid, that our spe-
cies has not developed some reliable way to stop itself from aggressive
behavior. If the catharsis theory held any water as a theory, and foot-
ball could be shown by the state to be a reliable conduit for its
realization, it would surely be a compelling state interest. As it is, the
state interest is illusory.
Again, I need not go into the second part of the constitutional
test-whether there is any less drastic alternative to achieving this state
interest-because illusory state interests cannot even rationally be ad-
vanced by any state practice.
D. Realistic Remedies
If a court were to entertain this serious ERA challenge, the most
difficult question would not be whether big-time football "as is" vio-
lates the state ERA. The real challenge for the plaintiffs would be
convincing the court to do something serious about it.
Unless a plaintiff in a sexual harassment case-even in a sexual as-
sault case-suffers serious medical injuries, her consequential damages
awards are not likely to be large.288 In any case, in my experience,
plaintiffs are not primarily concerned about money, nor even about
retribution. They want something done about what happened to them,
so that it doesn't happen to other women. Monetary deterrence is fine,
but serious injunctive relief is the as-yet unachieved litigation goal.
In Section III.D, supra, I described what appears to be an emerg-
ing doctrine in Title IX sexual assault cases, that individual plaintiffs
cannot seek injunctive relief. A state court in a suitable state constitu-
tional action would not have to confront those difficulties. Rather, the
questions would be the usual ones. First, is injunctive relief appropri-
ate, and second, what should the specific terms of the injunction be?
Judges and lawyers in the U.S. have too-long and rather thought-
lessly relied upon the centuries-old rule that injunctive relief should be
available only when legal remedies are "inadequate."2 89 For some sorts
of injuries, damages are always inadequate. The deprivation of a civil
288. One study of damages awarded in sexual harassment cases in the employment context
concludes that there is a "high degree of randomness in both compensatory and puni-
tive awards," and found that the median total award was only $105,000. Cass R.
Sunstein & Judy M. Shih, Damages in Sexual Harassment Cases, in DIRECTIONS IN
SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAw, supra note 119, at 337.
289. See generally OWEN M. Fiss, THE CVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION (1978); DOUGLAS LAY-
COCK, THE DEATH OF THE IRREPARABLE INJURY RULE (1991); Douglas Laycock, The
Death of the Irreparable Injury Rule, 103 HARv. L. REV. 687 (1990).
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right is the classic example of an irreparable injury29° for which com-
pensatory damages are inadequate. In such cases, injunctions regularly
issue, whether or not there is an accompanying claim for damages. As
Professor Douglas Laycok notes, "[wihat defense lawyer would argue
[the absence of] irreparable injury in Brown v. Board of Education,
Reynolds v. Sims, or a prison conditions case?" 29 1 Students will graduate
and most prisoners will complete their terms. Are their constitutional
interests not worth vindicating in the meantime? And why would any
or all systematic risks of sexual and educational harms to women be
less compelling than school desegregation, legislative apportionment,
or prison conditions?
When it comes to issuing a meaningful injunction limiting any
part of a football program, I think that the real obstacle would be
courts' thorough acculturation within our hegemonic sports culture. In
such cases, as Professor Laycock says, it could be that "courts prefer
legal remedies because they are less effective-not because they are
adequate, but because they are inadequate."'292 That is what seems to be
happening in those Title IX sexual abuse cases where federal courts say
plaintiffs cannot seek injunctions.
The overarching principle is that injunctions must be sufficiently
precise to enable those subject to it to conform their conduct to its
requirements.293 Indeed, much of the clamor against injunctive relief in
general has been based on the argument that it requires courts to
"make predictions about the future, and these judgments are widely
assumed to be treacherous, fraught with error.,,214
That argument is exaggerated, because the injunction is designed
to prevent a future harm, "conditioned upon a showing that there is a
probability (of some indeterminate magnitude) of that future wrong's
occurring." 295 The proposed terms of any injunction simply present
informational problems. In the case I hypothesize, the plaintiff would
290. That was one reason-that equality is priceless-why I've argued that sexual harass-
ment law should not be conflated with tort law. Scales, supra note 96, at 307.
291. Laycock, supra note 289, at 702.
292. Id. at 743 (emphasis added).
293. Fiss, supra note 289, at 80. Colorado law intones the usual admonition that equity
will not intervene when legal remedies are adequate, an admonition that seems to be
applied primarily with respect to preliminary injunctive relief. See, e.g., Am. Investors
Life Ins. Co. v. Green Shield Plan, 358 P.2d 473, 476 (Colo. 1961); Brennan v.
Monson, 50 P.2d 534, 536 (Colo. 1935); McLean v. Farmers Highline Canal & Res-
ervoir Co., 98 P. 16, 20-21 (Colo. 1908). On the other hand, Colorado recognizes
trial courts' wide discretion to allow injunctive relief in diverse circumstances. See,
e.g., Colo. Springs Bd. of Realtors, Inc. v. State, 780 P.2d 494, 498 (Colo. 1989).
294. Fiss, supra note 289, at 80.
295. Id. at 81.
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already have to have shown some specific aspects of a football program
that led to her harm, and that threaten to present similar harms in the
future. The remedy needs to put women in the place they would have
occupied in the absence of unconstitutional sex discrimination.
For example, in her original Title IX complaint, the plaintiff in
Simpson v. University of Colorado sought broad injunctive relief. She
originally requested an order that CU undertake programs:
(1) instituting and enforcing a comprehensive sexual harass-
ment policy, with the assistance of outside experts, and
enforcing a comprehensive sexual harassment policy that en-
compasses the Athletic Department and the football
program, and includes procedures for effective reporting of
sexual harassment incidents, effective and immediate crisis
response, and expanded victim assistance and protection; (2)
adopting binding and enforceable rules and regulations for its
football recruiting program that include, without limitation,
curfews on recruits and their student hosts; non-student
adult supervision at all recruiting events, parties, or other
gatherings; sexual harassment training for players; student
host training and education; distribution of written policies
to visiting recruits stating prohibited activities and conduct
and the consequences for violations; (3) adoption of a 'zero
tolerance policy' under which there will be expedited pro-
ceedings and punishment proportional to the offense for
violations of sexual harassment and recruiting policies; and
(4) an annual, independent review by the Chancellor's office,
with the participation of outside reviewers, of Athletic
Department compliance with the sexual harassment and re-
cruiting policies.296
The eventual settlement297 provided far less: (1) for the appoint-
ment of a "Title IX Advisor" for a five-year term, whose
recommendations would be considered "in good faith" by the Univer-
sity; (2) for clarification to the community about how to contact
him/her; and (3) for the appointment during an undisclosed term of a
"mutually agreed upon person" to serve as an independent advisor on
Title IX compliance. Again, that person's recommendations are for
296. Amended Complaint, supra note 27. Prayer for Relief, B (emphasis added).
297. In fairness, however, we should keep in mind that the University had "voluntary"
amended some of its recruiting policies well prior to settlement of the lawsuit. See su-
pra notes 77 and 81.
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consideration only. This last may be most significant, as the mutually
agreed-upon person is Professor Nancy Hogshead-Makar, a three-time
Olympic medalist and expert in Title IX law.
298
Missing, most obviously, are guarantees to adopt new rules, provi-
sions for enforceability of the rules, and glaringly, the matters plaintiff
had requested in the third paragraph of her injunctive prayer: zero-
tolerance policy for sexual harassment, and expedited proceedings and
proportional punishment for same. That's where the teeth are, in forc-
ing universities immediately to get offending players off the field.
Perhaps Professor Hogshead-Maker can make that happen. All power
to her.
In litigation of injunctive relief, a court would undoubtedly first
ask a defendant university to propose a compliance plan. It seems ab-
solutely critical in such cases that a court's willingness to use injunctive
power should be proportionate to the university's demonstrated history
of recalcitrance and deceit. Consider the CU case. There was ample
proof of years of resistance to reforming the football program to pro-
tect women's safety, of athletic department cover-ups of sexual
misconduct by football players, and of the imposition of minimal pun-
ishments for serious allegations of sexual assault by players.299
Moreover, with echoes of Mike Nifong's conduct in the Duke lacrosse
case, counsel for the university engaged in what appears to be a griev-
ous course of withholding evidence during the resultant litigation.00 In
such circumstances, courts fashioning injunctive relief should be less
298. Allison Sherry, Critic of CU Hired to Guide Title IX Effort: The Respected Expert Will
Help Ensure That Women Are Safe from Violence and Discrimination, DENVER POST,
Mar. 11., 2008, at Al. Professor Hogshead-Makar has also been hired by the Univer-
sity of North Carolina-Chapel Hill to advise on Title IX compliance after settlement
of the recent case concerning the behavior of the women's soccer coach. Id. Among
Professor Hogshead-Maker's academic works in the area, see A Critique of Tilting the
Playing Field: Schools, Sports, Sex and Title IX, 13 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 101 (2003)
(reviewing JESSICA GAVORA, TILTING THE PLAYING FIELD: SCHOOLS, SPORTS, SEX
AND TITLE IX (2002)); Is Title X Really to Blame for the Decline in Intercollegiate
Men's Nonrevenue Sports?, 14 MARQ. SPORTS REV. 65 (2003) (with Daniel R. Mar-
burger); Intercollegiate Athletics' Unique Environments for Sexual Harassment Claims:
Balancing the Realities ofAthletics with Preventing Potential Claims, 13 M..tQ. SPORTS
REV. 173 (2003) (with Sheldon Eliot Steinbach).
299. See supra text accompanying notes 29-41.
300. During discovery and even after summary judgment, CU concealed evidence of sex-
ual assaults by football players of two female trainers and one female "ambassador."
Appellants' Opening Brief [Redacted], supra note 28, at 32-33; During a hearing on
a Motion to Compel this evidence, counsel for the University lied about having it. Id.
at 35. It is difficult to imagine what evidence could be more directly probative of the
Title IX standards of "actual knowledge" of and "deliberate indifference" to the risks
presented by football players.
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willing to grant leeway to the university in proposing, and particularly
in proposing to self-monitor, a compliance plan.
Facing a recalcitrant institution, a judge might get its attention by
ordering the dismissal of coaches and athletic department officials, sus-
pending the football program temporarily, or requiring dissociation of
the football program from the NCAA. Indeed, the court could use any
of the remedies that the NCAA could use-that organization has no
legal monopoly on the sorts of interventions that athletic programs
have come to understand.'O
In any and all cases, the injunction has to be more than cosmetic,
more than appointing experts whose recommendations may or may
not be followed. Again assuming the facts, insofar as they are known,
of the CU case, the underlying problem is the structure and govern-
ance of the football program. Shouldn't an injunction in some sense
aim to defuse the hyper-masculinization of the football team, beyond
prohibitions of rape in a code of student conduct manual and an hour-
long seminar on date rape? I believe there are three essential changes
that are well within a court's power to order.
First, the injunction must focus on non-discretionary enforcement
of policies against sexual harassment and assault. For example, as dis-
cussed in Section III.B. supra, university policies must be consistent
regarding both criminal charges and the absence of criminal charges.
Ideally, the policy should be that if a player is accused of sexual har-
assment or assault, but that person is not indicted, there should
nonetheless be an independent university investigation to determine
compliance with the university sexual harassment code. If that person
is indicted, he should be suspended from play pending trial. If he en-
ters a guilty plea or a no contest plea or is convicted, he should be
expelled. If he is acquitted, he should be reinstated. There must be
very little room for university discretion in applying such rules, and
they have to be made tamper-proof.
301. In addition, if a university's governing body were to take some similar dramatic
measures, a court would probably back it up. See Sigma Chi Fraternity v. Regents of
the Univ. of Colo., 258 F. Supp. 515 (D. Colo. 1966). In that matter, the Regents
put the fraternity on probation-suspending rushing and pledging privileges--due to
the CU chapter's failure to condemn the racially discriminatory policy of the national
organization. Interestingly, Sigma Chi raised a mooness challenge because the CU
chapter had sent a letter terminating its national affiliation; the court rejected that ar-
gument. Id. at 522-24. The court went on to uphold the Regents' power to
discipline Sigma Chi, and cited with approval a case where a Board had abolished a
fraternity altogether. Id. at 526-27.
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Second, that enforcement-including decisions about players can
participate in upcoming games-must be taken out of the hands of
coaches and athletic directors.
Third, coaching responsibilities need to be reexamined, and con-
tracts configured-even by court order-to vest responsibility for
player sexual misconduct. There is no such thing as a standardized col-
lege coaching contract. Colleges utilize a wide variety of approaches in
describing their abilities to fire a coach "for cause." °2 For example,
Gary Barnett's CU contract had a relatively narrow set of "for cause"
definitions. The contract would have expired on July 31, 2007. When
CU wanted to get rid of Barnett at the end of the 2005 season, the
only relevant contractual "for cause" term was to fire Barnett for "[a]ny
conduct of Coach Barnett during the term of this agreement that leads
to his conviction under any criminal statute or for moral turpitude."3 '
Loose drafting problems did not help when CU claimed it was firing
Barnett for cause, and Barnett claimed CU was in breach of contract.
In such situations, coaches seem more willing than universities to air
the dirty laundry in court.3 Thus, CU paid Barnett $3,000,000 in
exchange for his agreement not to file a breach of contract suit.0 5
A few college contracts presently provide bonuses to coaches when
their players don't get in trouble. Might a court order a university to
institute a contractual floor for coaching responsibility? Serious train-
ing and supervision of players with regard to sexual assault could be
one such provision. 6 And surely, coaches could be contractually
302. Martin J. Greenberg, Termination of College Coaching Contracts: When Does Adequate
Cause Exist to Terminate Exist and Who Determines Its Existence?, 17 M.ARQ. SPORTS L.
REv. 197, 255 (2006).
303. Amended and Restated Employment Agreement between Gary Barnett and the Uni-
versity of Colorado, ' 21(b)(ii) (Mar. 18, 2003) (on file with author).
304. Greenberg, supra note 302, at 256. As an illustration of this principle, Mr. Greenberg
describes the matter of the former CU coach, Rick Neuheisel, and his separation
from the University of Washington football program for having participated in an
NCAA "March Madness" office pool, in violation of NCAA rules. Mr. Neuheisel
subsequently received $4.7 million in settlement. College coaching contracts typically
do not provide that coaches will be let go for losing. Id. at 231-35.
305. Settlement and Release of Claims between Gary Barnett and the University of Colo-
rado, 9J 6, 10 (Jan. 24, 2006) (on file with author).
306. When pushed to explain why football programs don't have more rigorous sexual
assault rules, it is typical for football apologists to say that those are disciplinary prob-
lems that have no direct effect on the game. For example, a former National Football
League employee assistant program director stated that, "[g]ambling and drug [disci-
plinary] policies were instituted because they have a direct and detrimental effect on
the game itself ... But this domestic violence thing is different. It's a society thing
and there are laws that govern it." Bill Brubaker, Violence in Football Extends Off
Field, WASH. PosT, Nov. 13, 1994, at Al. Never mind that drugs and gambling are
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bound by a provision that they will be fired for cover-ups or interfer-
ing in investigations of sexual assault. I see that constitutional
challenges would be raised, but courts have all manner of ways to
make it happen.
CONCLUSION
Most plaintiffs' civil rights lawyers rejoiced, at least momentarily,
upon hearing that the University of Colorado settled with the women
who had brought the Title IX claim against the University for the
sexually-assaultive behavior of its football team and recruits. The pat-
tern was so familiar. The University got summary judgment. After
strenuous efforts on the parts of many lawyers, a federal appellate
court was convinced that maybe, somehow, there could be some facts
in dispute on which a jury could shed light, even when a great college
football team's reputation was at stake.
The University decided not to go to trial. There was a lot of evi-
dence that it could not risk becoming public. But of course, in
settlement, the University denied all liability, sealed all that evidence,
and probably won the public relations war. The plaintiff walked away
with some public acknowledgment, a paper victory, and a few bucks
(including pennies on the dollar for her paid attorneys, as opposed to
the University's outside counsel, who apparently received $3,000,000).
Every civil rights lawyer knows what I'm talking about.
Perhaps Title IX law is changing, but only in allowing plaintiffs to
get past summary judgment, after expensive discovery and pre-trial
motions stages. Very few plaintiffs will have the resources to get that
far, particularly given the Title IX burden on the plaintiff to show the
subjective indifference of institutions to risks of sexual assault. The
damages paid and defense attorneys' fees expended while dragging
plaintiffs out past summary judgment and appeal are chicken-feed,
meaningless compared to the University's allegiance to big-time sports.
Moreover, Title IX plaintiffs cannot, to date, achieve significant in-
junctive relief against educational institutions, or at least not
injunctive relief that will matter over the long run. Universities have
nothing, really, to fear from Title IX.
Neither the NCAA nor member institutions, under present cir-
cumstances, will provide much help. Plaintiffs in these situations
should engage state constitutional provisions that prohibit sex dis-
"society things" and there are many laws that govern them. In any case, if serious sex-
ual assault policies really wouldn't affect the game, why not have them?
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crimination in order to seek serious and specific injunctions against
the universities, athletic departments, coaches, and programs that pre-
sent risks of harms to women. State constitutional provisions are an
underused resource. A challenge under some such provisions would
take the issues out of the realms of half-baked stock arguments and
stilted legal categories, possibly even to examine what equality actually
can mean in the university setting. t

